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Suzanne B. Goldberg 
 
Discrimination by Comparison 
abstract.  Contemporary discrimination law is in crisis, both methodologically and 
conceptually. The crisis arises in large part from the judiciary’s dependence on comparators—
those who are like a discrimination claimant but for the protected characteristic—as a favored 
heuristic for observing discrimination. The profound mismatch of the comparator methodology 
with current understandings of identity discrimination and the realities of the modern workplace 
has nearly depleted discrimination jurisprudence and theory. Even in run-of-the-mill cases, 
comparators often cannot be found, particularly in today’s mobile, knowledge-based economy. 
This difficulty is amplified for complex claims, which rest on thicker understandings of 
discrimination developed in second-generation intersectionality, identity performance, and 
structural discrimination theories. By treating comparators as an essential element of 
discrimination, instead of as a heuristic device to help discern whether discrimination has 
occurred, courts have largely foreclosed these other theories from consideration. At the same 
time, courts have further shrunk the very idea of discrimination by disregarding a central lesson 
from harassment and stereotyping jurisprudence: discrimination can occur without a comparator 
present. The comparator methodology retains its appeal, despite these deficiencies, because its 
empirical patina permits courts to evaluate discrimination claims without appearing to engage in 
a subjective analysis of workplace dynamics. Given the complex nature of both identity and 
discrimination, however, the comparisons produce a false certainty at best. By contrast, alternate 
methodologies, including the contextual consideration favored in harassment and stereotyping 
jurisprudence as well as the hypothetical comparator embraced in European law, offer a 
meaningful framework for matching discrimination law and norms to workplace facts, while 
preserving judicial legitimacy. With comparators dislodged from their methodological pedestal, 
we may yet recover space for the renewed development of discrimination jurisprudence and 
theory.  
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Contemporary discrimination law is in the midst of a crisis of 
methodological and conceptual dimensions. The underlying problem is that 
evaluating allegations of discrimination requires courts and others to see 
something that is not observable directly: whether an accused discriminator 
has acted because of a protected characteristic. While this challenge has long 
been with us, as putative discriminators rarely admit discriminatory intent,1 the 
crisis arises because the most traditional and widely used heuristic—
comparators, who are similar to the complainant in all respects but for the 
protected characteristic—is barely functional in today’s economy and is largely 
unresponsive to updated understandings of discrimination. 
Some decades ago, when identity-based differentiation was relatively open 
and notorious and when many workplaces were of a Tayloresque scale with 
easily comparable jobs,2 individuals claiming discrimination could often point 
to counterparts who were treated better. Courts could then deduce, with some 
confidence, that the protected trait was the reason for the adverse treatment at 
issue.3 But in a mobile, knowledge-based economy, actual comparators are 
 
1.  See, e.g., Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title 
VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1207 (2003) (recognizing 
that as soon as Title VII became law, “no sensible employer would admit that it based a 
decision on one of the prohibited classifications”).  
2.  See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911). For 
further discussion, see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
3.  In this sense, the comparator is used to show causation—that the challenged acts occurred 
because of the protected trait and would not have occurred absent impermissible reliance on 
that trait. The causation determination is necessary because one of the central inquiries in a 
discrimination case is whether the challenged acts were “because of” a protected 
characteristic. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, for example, that “[i]t shall 
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis 
added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623a-1 (2006) (forbidding, through the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, adverse employment actions “because of such individual’s age” (emphasis 
added)). 
To decide a disparate treatment claim under these and similar laws, a court must 
determine “whether the employer is treating ‘some people less favorably than others because 
of’” any of these characteristics. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) 
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). While 
comparators are not statutorily required to make this determination, courts have come to 
treat them, in many cases, as essential to showing the requisite discriminatory intent. See 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 
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hard to come by, even for run-of-the-mill discrimination claims.4 For the 
complex forms of discrimination made legible by second-generation theories, 
the difficulties in locating a comparator amplify exponentially.5 
This methodological problem has spilled over, conceptually, to constrict 
the very idea of discrimination. Consider Justice Thomas’s statement that a 
finding of discrimination cannot be made without “a comparison of otherwise 
similarly situated persons who are in different groups by reason of certain 
characteristics provided by statute.”6 Justice Kennedy has observed similarly 
that “one who alleges discrimination must show that she ‘received differential 
treatment vis-à-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily 
described characteristic.’”7 On this view, however abusively an employer treats 
its employees, the bad acts do not present a discrimination problem so long as 
 
ALA. L. REV. 191, 204-06 (2009) (observing that a similarly situated comparator is not 
required by statute but that “the absence of a comparator is often fatal to a claim”). Further, 
although the ultimate question whether a defendant employer acted because of a protected 
characteristic is reserved for trial, courts regularly evaluate the link between the facts 
presented and the protected characteristic in the course of deciding dispositive pretrial 
motions. Disparate impact cases do not require a similar showing of discriminatory intent. 
See infra Section III.C. In constitutional discrimination claims, by contrast, a showing of 
discriminatory intent is always required. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) 
(finding no legally cognizable claim of discrimination where a policy had a racially 
disproportionate impact but there was no evidence of discriminatory intent). 
The application of these doctrines and the related determinants of discrimination law’s 
scope is also shaped, more generally, by views of discrimination law’s social, political, and 
economic function. As Robert Post has observed, discrimination law is not actually 
concerned with eradicating all trait-based acts but rather only a subset of acts that has been 
socially disapproved. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000).  
4.  The case of Wendy Norville is illustrative. Norville was a black nurse who alleged that the 
hospital where she worked had discriminated against her by “refus[ing] to accommodate 
her disability despite having made job accommodations for two disabled white nurses.” 
Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.). 
Although Norville produced evidence about the better treatment of her white coworkers, she 
lost her claim because she did not persuade the court that other nurses were “subject to the 
same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and . . . engaged in 
conduct similar to [hers].” Id. at 96 (quoting Mazzella v. RCA Global Commc’ns Inc., 642 
F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Opsatnik v. 
Norfolk S. Corp., 335 F. App’x 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting the district court’s rejection of 
twenty-four proposed comparators). 
5.  See infra Section II.B.  
6.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
7.  Id. at 611 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
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they are committed in an evenhanded fashion.8 Their position, in essence, is 
that discrimination laws and norms do not impose obligations with 
meaningful abstract value. 
Yet this position foreshortens traditional understandings of discrimination 
even within the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence. As the case law that 
addresses harassment and stereotyping makes clear, objectionable trait-based 
acts and statements occur in the absence of a comparator.9 Indeed, in a well-
known stereotyping case, the Court acknowledged the lower court’s finding 
that no comparators existed, yet still found that the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, 
was discriminatorily denied partnership at her accounting firm.10 Likewise, in a 
much-discussed harassment case, the Court unanimously recognized that 
discrimination, in the form of sexual harassment, could occur in a work 
environment where only men were present.11 At the same time, the Court has 
acknowledged that the presence of a better-treated comparator does not 
transform permissible acts into unlawful ones. “Treating seemingly similarly 
situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the 
course,” Chief Justice Roberts recently wrote.12 
 
8.  This view is echoed by courts that have concluded that “equal opportunity” harassers, those 
who harass both men and women, do not violate sex discrimination prohibitions. See, e.g., 
Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a sex 
discrimination claim because “[i]n its totality, the evidence compels the conclusion that [the 
supervisor] was just . . . indiscriminately vulgar and offensive, . . . obnoxious to men and 
women alike”); cf. Kathryn Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New 
Patterns in the Search for Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 345 n.47 (1996) (describing “the 
dominant ‘equality theory’ understandings that animate antidiscrimination law” as 
comparative). 
9.  See infra Part IV. In conversation, Charles Sullivan has suggested that harassing acts and 
stereotyping statements amount to an admission of discriminatory intent. As will be 
elaborated below, I disagree with that contention, in part because employers ordinarily 
defend these kinds of acts and statements as nondiscriminatory and the courts often 
disagree with an employee’s contention that the specified speech or conduct reflects 
discriminatory intent. 
10.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989). 
11.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). For discussion of other 
circumstances in which an antidiscrimination norm may be violated absent an actual 
comparator, including the possible role of a hypothetical comparator, see infra Section VI.B. 
12.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008). 
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Still, the scope of discrimination law continues to shrink.13 The judicial 
demand for comparators continues largely unabated outside the harassment 
and stereotyping contexts,14 sharply narrowing both the possibility of success 
for individual litigants15 and, more generally, the very meaning of 
discrimination. 
 
13.  I develop this claim primarily through identity-discrimination cases brought under federal 
employment discrimination laws rather than through cases that rest on constitutional equal 
protection challenges, state law claims, or discrimination claims outside the employment 
context. Yet, as will be elaborated, the analysis here is not limited to statutory prohibitions 
against discrimination or to the employment context. Discrimination based on factors other 
than identity, however, such as forms of economic discrimination addressed in antitrust law, 
is beyond this Article’s scope. Still, some of the discussion below may be useful for the 
conceptualization of discrimination in those areas as well.  
14.  See infra Part I. 
15.  On the dismal fate of most discrimination claimants, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 429, 444, 449-52 (2004). See also Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon 
Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination 
Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 176-77 (2010) 
(concluding that employment discrimination plaintiffs “receive cursory attention in legal 
process and a limited remedy” and that discrimination law “seldom offers an authoritative 
resolution of whether discrimination occurred”). Employment discrimination plaintiffs who 
prevail at trial lose on appeal forty-two percent of the time; judgments for employer-
defendants are reversed in fewer than eight percent of cases. Clermont & Schwab, supra, at 
450; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: 
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 958 
(describing employment discrimination plaintiffs as “one of the least successful classes of 
plaintiffs at the trial court level” as well as on appeal). 
Individuals who present claims involving more than one aspect of their identity—such 
as race and sex—fare even worse. Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at 
Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439 (2009) (discussing disproportionately high loss 
rates for individuals who bring complex discrimination claims). A new empirical study 
reinforces that even when individuals do not bring claims based on “overlapping axes of 
disadvantage,” their “demographic diversity” further reduces their likelihood of success in 
discrimination litigation. Rachel Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of 
Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 5) (on file with author). 
Some scholars maintain that courts’ hostility toward discrimination claims is 
ideologically based. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22-26 (2006) (asserting that courts resist a 
structural approach to discrimination claims, in part, because many judges are ideologically 
opposed to second-guessing decisions by employers); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment 
Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 561-69 (2001) (arguing that 
“courts approach cases from a particular perspective that reflects a bias against the claims” 
and that this ideological bias colors how courts adjudicate discrimination claims). On this 
view, the choice of the comparator heuristic, which narrows the set of discrimination claims 
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In this Article, I argue that we are seeing the transformation of a heuristic 
device16 for observing discrimination into a defining element of discrimination 
and that this collapse presents two serious problems. First, methodologically, 
comparators’ deficiencies have come to outweigh their strengths as devices for 
discerning discrimination. Specifically, the demand for similarly situated, 
better-treated others underinclusively misses important forms of 
discrimination and forecloses many individuals from having even an 
opportunity to be heard because sufficiently close comparators so rarely exist.17 
The second problem is conceptual. Since the early 1990s, much of the 
theoretical work on discrimination has attempted to make legible the many 
ways in which discrimination occurs beyond the forms of easily recognizable, 
deliberate exclusion that are based on relatively thin conceptions of protected 
traits.18 Yet when comparators are treated as definitional, these theories cannot 
gain jurisprudential traction because the problems they identify cannot, in 
effect, be seen by courts. 
 
likely to succeed, as explained below, could be seen as both deliberate and in service of 
ideologically motivated, outcome-oriented aims. Whether or not this is actually the reason 
for courts’ embrace of the comparator heuristic, the lack of transparency and accountability 
associated with the assumptions and judgments embedded in the heuristic’s selection 
triggers the inquiries I pursue here. 
16.  For an extended discussion of heuristics, see SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE 
POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 52-72 
(2007). Page explains that heuristics are, in essence, thinking rules that generate solutions to 
problems. Id. at 55. In discrimination cases, the critical factor—discriminatory intent—is 
hidden from view, and the comparator heuristic works by reducing the set of likely 
explanations for the adverse treatment that triggered the claim.  
The term “heuristics” came to prominence in cognitive psychology during the 1970s 
through the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who “posited that because 
decisionmaking often involves an abundance of information, time pressures, and an array of 
possible alternatives, people intuitively and unconsciously use cognitive shortcuts or 
‘heuristics’ to make decisions about probabilities.” Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional 
Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 395-96 
(2006); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lecture, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1556, 1558 (2004) (analyzing the “pervasive role” that heuristics play in legal 
judgments). See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
17.  See infra Parts II & III.  
18.  See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). As will become apparent, first- and second-generation claims 
are best understood as falling along a spectrum, rather than as sharply distinct. See infra Part 
II. 
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This Article considers three of the leading theories.19 The first is 
intersectionality theory, which recognizes that although the law designates 
trait-based protections sequentially, employers and others often target 
individuals because of their identity as a whole, rather than because of 
individual traits in isolation from one another.20 In these situations, an 
employee, such as a black woman or a disabled older man, claims to have 
experienced discrimination based on a combination of legally protected traits. 
He or she struggles under a comparator regime in part because it can be 
difficult to decide who is the proper comparator—is it someone who shares 
neither of the individual’s traits or shares one but not the other? In addition, 
because intersectional plaintiffs are often few in number relative to all others in 
a workplace, decisionmakers tend to be skeptical of the comparison’s probative 
value and are typically unwilling to conclude that comparatively worse 
treatment is attributable to discriminatory intent rather than to the plaintiff’s 
idiosyncratic quirks. 
The second theory is identity performance, which conceives of identity 
traits in a thick way, recognizing that individuals sometimes experience 
discrimination because of stereotypes about behaviors or personal styles 
associated with their identity group rather than because of their phenotype. 
When operationalized, the theory produces cases in which employees and 
others seek to show that they have suffered trait-based discrimination because 
they have, for example, a Spanish-inflected accent or a traditionally African 
 
19.  Later in the Article I also briefly address additional second-generation theories related to 
implicit bias and other cognitive psychological research regarding discrimination. See infra 
Section V.C.  
20.  Intersectionality theory emerged in legal scholarship in the early 1990s. See, e.g., Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243-44 (1991) (“[T]he experiences of women of 
color are frequently the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . tend 
not to be represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism.”) (footnote 
omitted); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581, 585 (1990) (characterizing and criticizing “gender essentialism—the notion that a 
unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described independently of race, 
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”). More recent theory makes the 
point that the relationship among multiple identity traits is better characterized as 
multidimensional or cosynthetic, with traits interacting in both dominant and 
subordinating ways depending on the surrounding context. As Darren Hutchinson has 
written, “Multidimensionality theorists have attempted to move beyond intersectionality’s 
antiessentialist roots by examining questions of ‘intersecting’ privilege and subordination—
rather than simply focusing on the lives of individuals, such as women of color, who are 
excluded from ‘single-issue’ frameworks.” Darren Lenard Hutchinson, New Complexity 
Theories: From Theoretical Innovation to Doctrinal Reform, 71 UMKC L. REV. 431, 435-36 
(2002). For further discussion, see infra Section II.B. 
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hairstyle.21 Yet a comparator-based approach misses identity-performance 
theory’s point in all but the most limited circumstances. For example, we 
might imagine an employer refusing to promote one Latino but promoting 
several others and arguing that it was not ethnicity but personal style (that is, 
too much Spanish-speaking or too thick an accent) that led to the promotion 
denial. Unless there is a non-Latino comparator who speaks the same amount 
of Spanish or has the same accent, the claim will not be legible in an analytic 
regime that recognizes discrimination only in the presence of a better-treated 
counterpart.22 
The third is structural discrimination theory, which focuses on the ways in 
which the structures and dynamics of workplaces and other environments can 
effectuate—and obscure—discriminatory intent. Central to this theory are the 
“patterns of interaction among groups within the workplace that, over time, 
exclude nondominant groups” based on protected traits but are “difficult to 
trace directly to intentional, discrete actions of particular actors.”23 
Comparators, even if they exist, are unlikely to shed light on the identity traits 
 
21.  See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1297-98, 
1307-08 (2000). For further discussion, see infra Section II.B. 
22.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the claim that 
termination for speaking Spanish constituted national origin discrimination under Title 
VII); Fragante v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596, 599 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding 
that “[a]ccent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in many cases” but 
rejecting the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim because of the “effect of his Filipino 
accent on his ability to communicate”); Korpai v. A.W. Zengeler’s Grande Cleaners, Inc., 
No. 85 C 9130, 1987 WL 20428, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1987) (“Discrimination based on 
foreign immigration and speech with an accent is not discrimination based upon Hungarian 
ancestry or Hungarian characteristics, for purposes of Section 1981.”). But see Carino v. 
Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a determination 
that the plaintiff suffered discrimination because of his national origin and related accent). 
See generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents: 
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product 
of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 261 (1998) 
(discussing the relationship of accent discrimination to race- and ethnicity-based 
discrimination); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (analyzing accent 
discrimination and the related application of antidiscrimination law). For further discussion 
of identity performance theory, see infra notes 124-139. 
23.  Sturm, supra note 18, at 460; see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 623, 665 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture] (“[D]iscriminatory work 
cultures are too complex and too intertwined with valuable social relations to be easily 
regulated through judicial pronouncements and direct regulation of relational behavior.”). 
See generally Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating 
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007) (describing and defending structural 
discrimination theory). 
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that motivated the exclusionary interaction patterns in all but the most blatant 
situations. The judicial insistence on comparators thus renders imperceptible 
the link between the protected trait and the reduction in opportunities or 
increase in adverse treatment. 
Stepping back, we see that the comparator methodology has left these 
theories virtually noncognizable in the adjudication context and, by doing so, 
has depleted antidiscrimination norms of much of their content. Put another 
way, the synergistic relationship between the law’s production of observational 
tools and those tools’ production of law has put comparators in a position to 
shape and limit what courts can see as discriminatory. 
Several payoffs follow from this clarified picture of the comparator 
methodology’s consequences. For one, by putting into stark relief how little 
work discrimination law is doing in court, we can flesh out more of the story 
behind the numerous empirical studies showing that discrimination plaintiffs 
lose their cases at disproportionately high rates.24 That is, the mismatch 
between the comparator heuristic and today’s work world helps make sense of 
why so many discrimination plaintiffs lose their cases. 
In addition, a more robust understanding of the comparator methodology’s 
conceptual limitations prompts us to revisit Lon Fuller’s observations 
regarding the forms and limits of adjudication,25 this time in the context of 
discrimination law. Here we find a longstanding debate about whether 
discrimination law already overreaches and, even if it does not, whether the 
newer theories press it to do so.26 Some argue that because we are largely past 
 
24.  See supra note 15. 
25.  Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Fuller 
defined adjudication as involving the “authoritative determination of questions raised by 
claims of right and accusations of guilt” through the consideration of “proofs and reasoned 
arguments,” id. at 368-69, and then focused on addressing adjudication’s limitations, 
particularly in circumstances that required, for proper resolution, a managerial-style analysis 
of polycentric and dynamic conflicts. To the extent that claims require these types of 
analyses and judgments, which do not rest on proofs and reasoned argument, Fuller argued 
that they demand more than reasonably can be asked of an adjudicator. Id. at 370-71. 
26.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59-78 (1992) (objecting to discrimination laws because they interfere 
with the efficiencies gained in a homogeneous work environment); John J. Donohue III, 
Essay, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (maintaining that Title VII’s ban 
on discrimination may maximize social welfare); Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in 
the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 157 (2009) (discussing disagreements 
regarding whether discrimination law prohibits the types of employer conduct captured by 
structural discrimination theories); cf. Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, 
(How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 
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the primordial phase of identity discrimination, with its overt or obvious 
trait-based differentiations, a modified or new paradigm may be needed to 
redress ongoing issues in the workplace.27 Others take the position that, 
whatever one’s normative preferences, courts are simply not capable of 
entertaining the complex, multifaceted forms of discrimination that the newer 
theories elaborate.28 Still others maintain that discrimination law has much it 
can do to address those whose identity-based injuries were missed by first-
generation analyses. 
Rather than join this debate directly, my interest here is in using the 
clarified picture of comparator-centric analysis to gauge the possibilities and 
limits for both adjudication and theory in this area, however thinly or thickly 
identity-based protections are conceived. By shedding light on why the 
methodology has had such sticking power notwithstanding its striking 
 
1059 (2009) (“The unconscious bias discourse is as likely to subvert as to further the goal of 
substantive racial justice.”). 
27.  See infra Section II.B. 
28.  See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479, 
2481 (1994) (describing the difficulty courts have in giving an account of complex cases 
“that would help integrate such claims into the mainstream of Title VII doctrine”); Jonah 
Gelbach, Jonathan Klick & Lesley Wexler, Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense 
To Pay Too Little?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800 (2010) (arguing that discrimination law does 
not reach employers who design compensation packages to “avoid[] hiring individuals from 
[a] disfavored group”); Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
51, 54 (2003) (“[A]ny theory of discrimination that is sufficiently clear to provide 
guidance . . . cannot deal adequately with the varied, complex, and shifting dynamics and 
normative meaning of group-based discrimination.”); cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good 
on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace 
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1900 (2009) (maintaining, with respect to unconscious 
discrimination, that “[a]ggressive legal strategies” may “have a negative effect on people’s 
internalization of nondiscrimination norms” and exacerbate rather than “reduc[e] 
undesirable behaviors”). 
In addition, some second-generation theory has challenged the primacy of litigation as a 
means for redressing discrimination while also recognizing the value of courts working 
collaboratively with employers to restructure workplaces. See Sturm, supra note 18, at 522-23 
(recognizing the potential for achieving results through litigation where employers and 
courts engage collaboratively in problem solving); see also Susan Sturm, Law’s Role in 
Addressing Complex Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 35 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, eds., 2005) 
(analyzing the role of courts in elaborating norms and working with nonlegal actors to shape 
responses to complex discrimination). Others, however, have moved in directions more 
attenuated from law, focusing primarily on redressing social norms around identity and 
discrimination by restructuring extralegal conversations. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, 
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).  
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deficiencies, we can begin to develop a picture of the features necessary to 
create viable supplements or alternatives. 
This Article proposes that the comparator methodology has retained its 
popularity in large part because it serves entrenched judicial-legitimacy 
preferences that favor clearly defined and identifiable categories and, relatedly, 
disfavor sociologically oriented inquiries. With the advantage of an empirical 
patina, comparators suggest that the slippery interactions between law and 
lived experience in this area are susceptible to data-driven analysis based on 
workplace facts and that the resolution of claims does not rest on a judge’s 
subjective perceptions of complex workplace dynamics.29 This fits with the 
general inclination of courts to analyze issues involving complex social 
judgments in ways that appear to turn on “facts” rather than normative 
judgments.30 
Along these lines, comparators can also be described as having the virtues 
of rules because they function to delineate sharply between situations where 
discrimination might occur and where it might not. As a result, they appear to 
constrain courts charged with discerning discrimination and, by the same 
token, offer predictability to employers interested in avoiding discrimination 
suits.31 
On the other hand, however, comparators’ empirical cast masks the 
inevitable and contestable judgments about the qualities that make for an 
acceptable comparison,32 as well as the underlying normative judgments about 
the nature of discrimination and the capacity of existing law to remedy 
 
29.  See infra Part V. Within the employment arena, comparators are likely also appealing 
because their limited reach enhances the preservation of employer autonomy in workplace 
decisionmaking, which has proven to be an enduring value in this area. See infra notes 
215-217 and accompanying text. 
30.  See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-
Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2006) [hereinafter Goldberg, Constitutional 
Tipping Points]; Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist 
Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629 (2002) [hereinafter Goldberg, Anti-Essentialist and 
Social Constructionist Arguments]. 
31.  On these and other virtues of rules, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). Yet, as will be shown below and has been 
addressed more generally in the context of the rules/standards debate, rule-like measures 
and frameworks are typically embedded with unarticulated standard-like assumptions, 
reinforcing the point that a binary distinction between rules and standards often masks the 
mutually constitutive nature of those categories. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) 
(showing the malleability of rule and standard characterizations).  
32.  Cf. Devon W. Carbado, The Ties that Bind, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 283, 294 (1998) 
(“[O]ur identities are, on some level, unmanageable—fluid, contingent, and contestable.”). 
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discriminatory harms.33 In the terms of the rules/standards debate, we could 
thus say that the rule-like function of the comparator depends fundamentally 
on normative, and standard-like, judgments about comparators’ probative 
value. 
 
33.  For example, a comparator framework focuses on capturing formal equality violations but 
misses the antisubordination theorists’ concern with workplace conditions that are formally 
equal but nonetheless exacerbate trait-related differences among employees. It will miss, for 
example, the particular consequences for women when an employer refuses to allow breaks 
or private space for breastfeeding because there are no male comparators. Likewise, an 
employer who regularly makes sexualized or race-related comments to all employees would 
not face a comparator-based claim because all employees would be subjected to the same 
epithets. Yet the lack of breastfeeding accommodations as well as the making of sexual or 
racist remarks can surely have a trait-differentiated effect on the ability of women and 
members of racial minorities to perform in the workplace. See Lucinda M. Finley, 
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986) (“[P]arceling out goods such as workplace benefits 
according to egalitarian distributive principles may not result in people’s positions actually 
coming out equal in the end.”); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE 128 (1989) (arguing that “neutral” norms perpetuate bias); Ruth 
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 
(1986) (advocating an antisubordination approach); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1059-61 (1978) (suggesting that the individualization of 
discrimination claims has undermined efforts to use discrimination law to promote 
distributive justice in the face of the historical practice of discriminating against a particular 
group); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983) (arguing for 
approaches to ending discrimination that emphasize substantive rather than formal or 
procedural equality). Specifically with respect to women in the workplace, see Mary E. 
Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 247, which observes that 
a framework concerned with formal equality will be unable to address job structures that 
clash with parenting responsibilities typically taken up by women; and Martha Chamallas, 
Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta, 44 VILL. L. REV. 337, 338 
(1999), which argues that “the ban on disparate treatment will not solve the work/family 
conflict for women who experience actual, rather than perceived, conflicts because they find 
that there are just not enough hours in the day.” 
Still, as Owen Fiss has observed, although “the ideal of equality . . . is capable of a wide 
range of meanings,” formal equality, which he describes as the “antidiscrimination 
principle,” has become a “mediating principle” that underlies the concept of equality in both 
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976); see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 
Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976) 
(defining the “antidiscrimination principle” as disfavoring racial classifications and arguing 
that other inequalities may need to be addressed by different theories and principles, 
including principles of economic justice). The Americans with Disabilities Act, with its 
requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodation to employees with 
qualifying disabilities, is understood as an exception to this general rule. 
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In this light, we can conclude that for all of the judgment avoidance and 
other instrumental values that comparators may bring to discrimination 
analysis, courts put too much faith in them. The judicial default to comparators 
crowds out not only other heuristics, but also other more textured conceptions 
of discrimination, all of which is to the detriment of discrimination 
jurisprudence and theory.34 By lowering the comparator heuristic’s pedestal, I 
aim to clear a remaining barrier in the path of first-generation cases and to 
illuminate and begin to redress the challenge that the comparator heuristic’s 
dominance poses to second-generation theories’ translation to jurisprudence. 
While the constraining effect of judicial-legitimacy concerns must be taken 
into account, I argue that these concerns need not limit courts’ observation of 
discrimination to instances where comparators can be found. Indeed, an 
additional payoff from broadening the frame and considering other approaches 
to seeing discrimination is that the rigidity and blinder-like effects of the 
insistence on comparators come more clearly into focus. Concomitantly, the 
virtues of the contextual analysis, currently applied mainly to harassment and 
stereotyping claims, become clearer, as does that methodology’s applicability to 
other discrimination cases. 
Part I of this Article sets the foundation for the discussion here by outlining 
the ways in which courts rely on comparators as both a default heuristic and an 
element of discrimination law. Part II then shows that, notwithstanding the 
occasional value of comparators for revealing discrimination, courts’ treatment 
of comparators as central to discrimination analysis functions primarily to filter 
out, rather than to facilitate recognition of, numerous types of discrimination. 
This Part shows, too, the ways in which the insistence on comparators is 
especially devastating for second-generation claims that rest on 
intersectionality, identity performance, and structural theories of 
discrimination. Building on this descriptive presentation, Part III looks 
critically at the comparisons that we do accept, exposes the assumptions 
embedded in them, and suggests that comparators do not warrant the degree 
of reliance we now give them as illuminators of discrimination. Part IV 
considers contextual analysis as a methodological alternative to comparators 
 
34.  This effort to reduce dependence on a flawed method for observing discrimination 
dovetails, in a sense, with James Greiner’s recent effort to challenge the dominance of 
multiple regression analysis as the chief statistical technique for observing discrimination. 
See D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533 (2008). 
For another approach to enhancing the value of statistical analysis in enabling comparison, 
see Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
2081 (2009). 
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and shows how this approach governs discrimination cases involving 
harassment and stereotyping. 
Part V asks why comparators have had such sticking power, given their 
serious limitations and the existence of alternate means of observing 
discrimination. My aim here is both to shed light on the judicial-legitimacy 
considerations that reinforce reliance on comparators and to identify factors 
that may affect the potential for new methodologies to gain traction. I argue 
that the sociologically complex nature of identity discrimination, combined 
with entrenched concerns about unduly invading employer autonomy, lead 
courts to prefer empirically styled observational approaches. These approaches, 
in turn, can avoid the appearance of judicial subjectivity in evaluating 
workplace dynamics. With these factors in mind, Part VI proposes and 
evaluates several alternate methodologies intended to destabilize the 
dominance of comparators in discrimination analysis. It considers, as well, 
whether these alternatives can help recover the space for judicial consideration 
of antidiscrimination norms that the comparator heuristic’s narrow window 
has largely shut out from consideration. 
i .  the emergence and instantiation of comparators in 
discrimination law 
Observations about the relationship between comparators and 
discrimination have ancient roots, dating back, at least, to Aristotle’s 
observation that unequal treatment occurs when likes are not treated alike.35 
Incorporating this view, contemporary discrimination law designates a set of 
protected characteristics (or, in Aristotle’s terms, establishes a group of “likes”) 
and imposes penalties on employers who use these characteristics as a basis for 
treating employees differently and adversely (treating the “likes” as “not 
alike”). Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, specifies that it is 
unlawful for an employer to “discriminate . . . because of” race, sex, and the 
other characteristics protected in the law.36 
 
35.  ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131a-b (Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.). Aristotle also acknowledged that difficulty inhered in determining 
whether comparators were sufficiently like each other. There is some irony in linking 
Aristotle to today’s antidiscrimination regime in that he was arguably more concerned with 
the problem of treating unlikes equally than in insuring broad-based equality. Id. (“[T]his is 
the source of quarrels and recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares 
or unequals equal shares.”) (emphasis added). 
36.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
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While the statute itself, like other antidiscrimination measures, does not 
define discrimination in a comparative sense,37 comparators have clear appeal 
as an aid for gauging whether discrimination has occurred. Initially, they make 
visible the occurrence of comparatively adverse treatment by showing that not 
all employees have been fired, disciplined, or otherwise unfavorably treated. 
Then, comparison of the better- and worse-treated employees helps isolate 
whether the protected trait is the reason for the adverse action. If an employer 
has two employees who are similar but for X characteristic, and the employer 
treats Employee X worse than Employee Not-X, we are generally comfortable 
inferring that X is the basis, or cause, for the different treatment.38 As the 
Second Circuit explained, “In the run of the mill discrimination cases . . . a 
plaintiff can make a showing of disparate treatment simply by pointing to the 
adverse employment action and the many employees who suffered no such 
fate.”39 
Of course, an inference is a logical determination from known facts,40 not a 
guarantee of what actually occurred. But that is all that the law can reasonably 
require if courts are to find discrimination where the employer denies having 
discriminated.41 Consequently, because of their utility in producing inferences 
 
37.  It does elaborate the areas in which unlawful adverse treatment might occur, including 
hiring and firing but also “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 
Id. § 2000e-2(a). 
38.  Cf. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 10, 14 (1987) (observing that “what initially may seem to be an objective stance may 
appear partial from another point of view”).  
39.  Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Billingsley v. 
Jefferson Cnty., 953 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence of race 
discrimination where black employees were fired for excessive absences while a white 
employee was only suspended for three days); Bradley v. Americold Servs., No. Civ. A. 97-
2161-KHV, 1997 WL 613335 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 1997) (denying summary judgment where an 
employer terminated the black plaintiff for allegedly threatening harm to a coworker but 
only suspended a white supervisor for threatening to kill two employees). But see, e.g., 
Flores v. Preferred Technical Grp., 182 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a national origin 
discrimination claim where the plaintiff was terminated for breaking a work rule violated by 
twenty-seven other employees, and where she and her sister (who was fired for a different 
reason) were the only two recognizably Hispanic employees and the only two fired). 
40.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inference as “[a] conclusion 
reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”); cf. 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007) (“defining ‘inference’ 
as[, inter alia,] ‘a conclusion [drawn] from known or assumed facts or statements’”) (citing 
16 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 949 (2d ed. 1989) (second alteration in original)). 
41.  Cf. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (noting that 
“[t]he law often obliges finders of fact to inquire into a person’s state of mind” and that 
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of discrimination, comparators have emerged as the predominant 
methodological device for evaluating discrimination claims. Yet courts rely on 
them far beyond their evaluative function, to the point that comparators are 
treated not only as a useful heuristic for evaluating claims but also as an 
essential element of a discrimination claim. 
A. Comparators as the Default Methodology for Observing Discrimination 
It is not surprising that courts have long looked to comparators as a tool to 
aid in discerning whether impermissible discrimination has occurred. As the 
Supreme Court explained early in its employment discrimination 
jurisprudence, evidence that an employer treated comparable white workers 
better than a black employee would be “[e]specially relevant” to showing 
discrimination.42 
Indeed, in the case just quoted, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the 
Court first set out the burden-shifting framework that is now widely used in 
evaluating employment discrimination claims where a plaintiff lacks direct 
evidence of discrimination and is thus a focal point for the comparator 
demand.43 This framework, when applied in the context of a hiring 
 
“‘[i]t is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular 
time is’” (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] Ch.D. 459 at 483 (Eng.))). 
42.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). The Court recognized that 
other forms of evidence “may be relevant to any showing of pretext,” including “facts as to 
the petitioner’s treatment of respondent during his prior term of employment; petitioner’s 
reaction, if any, to respondent’s legitimate civil rights activities; and petitioner’s general 
policy and practice with respect to minority employment.” Id. at 804-05 (emphasis added). 
The Court added that “statistics as to petitioner’s employment policy and practice may be 
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner’s refusal to rehire respondent in this case 
conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against blacks.” Id. at 805. But the Court 
also “caution[ed] that such general determinations [about discrimination patterns from 
statistical analysis], while helpful, may not be in and of themselves controlling as to an 
individualized hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise justifiable reason 
for refusing to rehire.” Id. at 805 n.19. In effect, the Court suggested, absent an admission of 
racial motivation from the employer, a comparator would likely be the most effective means 
for showing whether impermissible discrimination had occurred because it could most 
reliably establish that race discrimination was a proximate cause for the employer’s actions. 
For discussion of discrimination cases in which courts have observed that actual 
comparators are not necessary to a discrimination claim, see infra Part IV. 
43.  Because employers typically refrain from directly linking their adverse actions to an 
employee’s protected trait, relatively few discrimination plaintiffs can present direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent, meaning evidence that “‘if believed, proves [the] existence 
of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.’” Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 
1266 (11th Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (quoting Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military 
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discrimination claim (the basis for Green’s claim against McDonnell Douglas), 
requires an applicant to show that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class; 
(2) applied to and was qualified for a position for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (3) was rejected for the position; and (4) that the position 
remained open after that rejection and/or the position was offered to someone 
else.44 Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the 
employer, who must offer a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to 
hire.45 After that, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the 
employer’s proffered reason was pretextual and that discrimination actually 
motivated the adverse action.46 
Within this framework, courts have split over precisely when the 
comparator becomes relevant.47 For some, an employee must produce a 
comparator at the outset, as part of the prima facie case; only after that will the 
 
Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also id. (describing direct evidence as “‘the 
most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate’ on the 
basis of some impermissible factor” (quoting Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 
(11th Cir. 1989))).  
44.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The precise elements of the prima facie case will vary 
depending on the factual context of the discrimination claim. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 
990 F.2d 1217, 1223 n.1 (11th Cir. 1993). For a discrimination claim in the context of ongoing 
employment, for example, courts typically require that the plaintiff establish a prima facie 
case by showing that “‘(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to 
adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated male employees 
more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.’” EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 
220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th 
Cir. 1999)). The Supreme Court has observed, in the context of an employment 
discrimination case involving McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, that the prima facie 
showing was “‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’” Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Furnco. Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567, 577 (1978)). 
45.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
46.  Id. at 807; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000) 
(explaining that discrimination can be deemed the “most likely” explanation for the 
employer’s conduct if the employer’s proffered justification is rejected). But see St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff does not necessarily 
establish pretext by disproving the employer’s proffered justification for its action).  
47.  See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 194, 208 (“[S]ometimes the presence or absence of a 
comparator is assessed by the court in determining whether plaintiff has made out her 
prima facie case,” but “more commonly, . . . the court tends to find comparators critical for 
pretext proof.”); cf. Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1290-91 (2008) (observing that plaintiffs can introduce evidence of 
discrimination at both the prima facie and pretext stages). Of course, not each step of the 
sequence (prima facie case, nondiscriminatory reason, showing of pretext) is reached in 
every case. 
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court shift the burden and require an employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory 
reason for its adverse action.48 Other courts require, or strongly encourage, the 
production of comparators only at the third, pretext phase of the sequence, at 
which point the employee must show that the employer’s real reason for acting 
adversely was the protected characteristic, notwithstanding any 
nondiscriminatory reasons that the employer advanced in response to the 
prima facie case.49 Although the difference between these approaches can have 
great significance for an individual case,50 I leave the debate about their relative 
virtues for another day, as my concerns with overreliance on the comparator 
heuristic exist at all stages of the adjudication process.51 
 
48.  See, e.g., Adebisi v. Univ. of Tenn., 341 F. App’x 111, 112 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that a 
plaintiff “failed to make a prima facie showing of . . . discrimination, because he failed to 
show that a similarly-situated, non-protected person was treated more favorably”); 
Drake-Sims v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 330 F. App’x 795, 801 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(same); Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1119 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); see also 
Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009) (describing as a prong of the 
prima facie case that the plaintiff must show that “he was treated less favorably because of 
his membership in that protected class than were other similarly situated employees who 
were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances”); Fields v. 
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); Flores v. Preferred 
Technical Grp., 182 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The linchpin of the plaintiff’s prima facie case 
is evidence of disparate treatment between members of the plaintiff’s protected class and 
nonmembers.”). 
49.  See, e.g., King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1063 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing and applying the 
comparator requirement in the context of the pretext evaluation); Wright v. Murray Guard, 
Inc., 455 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff had established a prima face case 
of race discrimination but lacked an adequate comparator to demonstrate pretext); Harvey 
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (same as King). 
In rejecting the position that a discrimination plaintiff must produce an actual 
comparator as part of the prima facie case, the Second Circuit criticized “the grotesque 
scenario where an employer can effectively immunize itself from suit if it is so thorough in 
its discrimination that all similarly situated employees are victimized.” Abdu-Brisson v. 
Delta Airlines Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001). See also supra note 8. 
50.  In a race discrimination case, the Eighth Circuit identified differing demands for 
comparators within its own circuit, which ranged from a strict comparator demand at the 
prima facie stage of the burden-shifting analysis to a “low threshold” demand at that stage, 
accompanied by more rigorous review at the pretext stage. Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 
F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2005). Opting for the low threshold requirement, the court explained 
that “[u]sing a more rigorous standard at the prima facie stage would ‘conflate the prima 
facie case with the ultimate issue of discrimination,’ thereby effectively eliminating the 
burden-shifting framework the Supreme Court has directed us to use.” Id. at 852 (quoting 
Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
51.  For further discussion of the insistence on comparators at the prima facie stage, see, for 
example, Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 839 (2002), which argues that requiring 
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Notably, while the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
facilitates examination of the challenged employment decision, it provides no 
guidance as to the techniques that a court should use to sift through the 
competing accounts of an employer’s action.52 The same is true of the 
“mixed-motive” burden-shifting framework, in which the employee shows at 
the outset that the protected trait was among the reasons for the employer’s 
actions and the employer, in response, attempts to show that it would have 
taken the same adverse act even without considering the protected trait.53 
Comparators become relevant to the analysis, then, because they help 
expose—whether in the single- or mixed-motive analysis—that “likes” have 
been treated in an “unlike” fashion and give rise to the inference that 
discrimination is the reason for that differentiation. The Supreme Court has 
regularly affirmed comparators’ value for this purpose,54 as have lower courts, 
 
comparative evidence at the prima facie stage “violates the statutory language and also has a 
number of other problems”; and Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate 
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2292 (1995), which maintains that “[s]erious 
problems inhere in requiring the plaintiff to produce comparative data at the prima facie 
stage of the case.” 
52.  See Malamud, supra note 51, at 2291 (pointing out that the McDonnell Douglass framework 
does not “by its terms” require comparative evidence).  
53.  In contrast to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, where the individual plaintiff bears the 
burden of persuasion throughout the adjudication process, in a mixed-motive case, once the 
individual has established the employer’s reliance on a protected trait, liability attaches and 
the employee will recover damages unless the employer can show persuasively that it would 
have “taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). In that case, the employee can still obtain certain kinds 
of declaratory or injunctive relief as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Id. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B)(i).  
54.  See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006) (“[Comparative evidence] may 
suffice, at least in some circumstances, to show pretext.”); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin 
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (assuming that a comparator would be useful to 
show that the employer had acted “because of” the plaintiff’s age); Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989) (“[A litigant] might seek to demonstrate that 
[the employer’s] claim to have promoted a better qualified applicant was pretextual by 
showing that she was in fact better qualified than the person chosen for the position.”). 
The comparator heuristic is used to observe discrimination in other contexts as well. 
With respect to the use of peremptory strikes of jurors during voir dire, for example, the 
Court has struggled to determine how best to see whether discriminatory intent, rather than 
permissible instinct, motivated the strike. In its most recent decision in this area, the Court 
reinforced the value of comparison in illuminating whether race discrimination had occurred 
in the use of a state’s peremptory strikes in a capital murder case. The Court first considered 
statistics showing the disproportionately high use of peremptory strikes against black 
potential jurors and then observed that 
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which also typically treat them as their preferred lens for evaluating 
discrimination claims.55 Commentators have observed as well that “the first 
step in most discrimination cases is for the plaintiff to identify an individual of 
another race (or the opposite sex, etc.) who was treated more favorably than 
she—a comparator.”56 
 
[m]ore powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons 
of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to 
serve. If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as 
well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence 
tending to prove purposeful discrimination.  
  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). 
55.  Gossett v. Okla. ex rel Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining, in a sex discrimination suit brought by a man who had been involuntarily 
withdrawn from a state university nursing program, that “evidence that the defendant 
treated the plaintiff differently from others who were similarly situated . . . is especially 
relevant to a showing of pretext”); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that a plaintiff seeking to show discriminatory conduct by the 
defendant “often does so by providing evidence that he was treated differently from other 
similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness”). As the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put the point, similarly situated comparators are 
“‘usually the most probative means of proving that an adverse action was taken for 
discriminatory reasons,’” even if they are “‘not absolutely necessary.’” Trs. of Health & 
Hosps. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 871 N.E.2d 444, 451 (Mass. 2007) 
(quoting Trs. of Health & Hosps. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 839 N.E.2d 
861, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)). 
56.  Sullivan, supra note 3, at 202. Sullivan adds: 
The reality on the ground is that discrimination cases today increasingly turn not 
on whether the plaintiff has proven her prima facie case or established that the 
“legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” is a pretext for discrimination (although 
the courts continue to invoke the McDonnell Douglas mantra), but rather on 
whether the plaintiff has identified a suitable “comparator” who was treated more 
favorably than she. 
Id. at 193; see also Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
109, 181 n.270 (2007) (“The most common form of evidence offered in [cases based on 
unconscious discrimination or bias] is comparative evidence . . . .”); Lidge, supra note 51, at 
831-32 (describing the use of a comparator as “[a] common way of proving” discrimination 
on account of a protected characteristic). Treatises take this position as well. See, e.g., 1 LEX 
K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8D.04 n.3 (2d ed. 2009) (“The most common 
way of demonstrating that an employer’s explanation for an adverse employment action is 
pretextual is to show that similarly situated persons of a different race or sex received more 
favorable treatment.”); id. § 8.02[6] (explaining that where the plaintiff alleges failure to 
hire based on discrimination, the most common method of making a prima facie case “is to 
show that the employer subsequently hired someone for the position, and that the hired 
person had equal or lesser qualifications compared to those of the plaintiff”). 
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B. Comparators as a Defining Element of Discrimination Law 
In much of discrimination law, however, comparators have taken on an 
importance beyond their service as a potentially useful heuristic for seeing 
discrimination. They constitute, to many courts, a threshold requirement of a 
discrimination claim and, in that sense, part of discrimination’s very 
definition.57 On this view, discrimination occurs only when an actor has 
differentiated between two groups of people because of a protected trait, which 
means that the absence of a comparator signals the absence of discrimination. 
Lower courts and commentators regularly take this position, insisting that 
litigants identify comparators before their cases can proceed and treating the 
absence of a comparator as fatal to a claim.58 An observation by the Eleventh 
Circuit in a discrimination case brought by a black doctor who had been 
removed from his position at a federal correctional institution is illustrative: 
“[T]he plaintiff must show that his employer treated similarly situated 
employees outside his classification more favorably than [himself].”59 
 
57.  Justices Thomas and Kennedy have expressed such a view. See supra notes 6-7 and 
accompanying text. 
58.  See, e.g., Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that the plaintiff could not sustain her discrimination claims because she “[could not] show 
that similarly situated employees of other races were treated better”); Paluck v. Gooding 
Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that to establish a prima facie case 
for discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must show that “she was discharged while other, 
similarly-situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated 
more favorably”); Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(ruling that the plaintiff “did not produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that her termination was the result of race discrimination” because she failed to 
identify satisfactory comparators); 3 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 47.05 
(2d ed. 2009) (stating that, in the context of pregnancy discrimination, “if the employee 
cannot show that she was in fact treated differently from similarly situated non-pregnant 
employees, her claim will fail”); 3 LEX K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 54.02[6] 
(2010) (observing that where a plaintiff alleges discrimination in hiring, “failure of the 
plaintiff to present evidence of comparative qualifications of persons subsequently hired was 
sometimes viewed as fatal to a plaintiff’s prima facie case”). But see 3 LEX K. LARSON, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 47D.05 (2d ed. 2009) (analyzing EEOC v. Nw. Mem’l 
Hosp., 858 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Ill. 1994), where a “plaintiff’s failure to provide comparative 
evidence was not fatal to her case”). 
59.  Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). But see, e.g., Bryant 
v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2003) (maintaining that 
although comparative evidence may be “helpful,” a plaintiff “is not required as a matter of 
law to point to a similarly situated white comparator in order to succeed on a race 
discrimination claim”). 
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One analytic point is crucial here. If comparators are fundamental either to 
discrimination statutes or to our theoretical conceptualization of 
discrimination, then we can hardly object to their pervasive use. On the other 
hand, if comparators are merely one choice among several for how courts 
might go about the task of perceiving discrimination, as I contend here, then 
we have reason to be more concerned. These questions are addressed in Parts 
III and IV. For now, it is simply important to have a clear sense of comparators’ 
dominance in shaping discrimination jurisprudence. 
i i .  the comparator demand as a barrier to discrimination 
claims  
The judicial demand for comparators functions largely as a barrier to 
discrimination claims, accounting in part for the low success rates of these 
claims in ways that have gone underappreciated by courts and commentators. 
This Part catalogues the sets of circumstances in which courts’ insistence on the 
production of comparators inhibits or precludes discrimination claims.60 As the 
discussion shows, the comparator demand poses a serious obstacle both 
practically and conceptually. As a practical matter, comparators are hard to find 
even in workplaces with a diverse group of employees. And conceptually, the 
existence of a comparator is simply not relevant, under some discrimination 
theories, to the question whether discrimination has occurred. 
To assess the consequences of the comparator demand, I look separately at 
first- and second-generation discrimination claims. Although the two types of 
claims exist along a spectrum rather than as mutually exclusive groupings, the 
distinction is useful for illuminating the separate ways in which the demand 
operates for more traditional and more cutting-edge discrimination claims. As 
noted at the outset, the first-generation cases rest on generally accepted 
theories about both the kinds of discriminatory acts that are or should be 
prohibited by governing statutes and the scope of the traits protected under 
those statutes.61 These are, in other words, claims of sex, race, or other types of 
discrimination that would be easily recognizable to the person on the street 
even if they are not easily proven in court. The second-generation cases, by 
contrast, offer a thicker conceptualization of discrimination that has not 
achieved the same popular traction even though these cases are thought, in 
much of the scholarly literature, to be one of the most important next steps for 
 
60.  I leave to the following Parts consideration of the impact of the comparator approach on the 
meaning of discrimination. 
61.  See supra notes 18, 26 and accompanying text. 
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bringing discrimination law closer to lived experience. As will become 
apparent, a comparator-obsessed legal regime erects a serious barrier to many 
first-generation claims and renders second-generation claims even less likely to 
succeed. 
Before turning to the comparator demand’s distinct effects on first- and 
second-generation claims, one aspect of the comparator jurisprudence warrants 
initial attention for its effect on the evaluation of evidence in nearly all 
discrimination cases. When courts apply a comparator-based analysis, they 
frequently disregard or discount evidence that is not associated directly with 
the comparator. This means that adverse incidents directed at the plaintiff, 
such as hostile remarks or treatment by noncomparator coworkers or 
supervisors, are often marginalized as “stray” remarks and acts not worthy of 
serious consideration.62 As the Eleventh Circuit observed in a housing 
disability discrimination case that challenged a city’s use of zoning ordinances 
to close down a drug-rehabilitation halfway house, for example, “Evidence that 
neighbors and city officials are biased against recovering substance abusers is 
irrelevant absent some indication that the recoverers were treated differently 
than non-recoverers.”63 This deliberately acontextual approach, with its 
“willingness to continue to compartmentalize various aspects of plaintiff’s 
proof to find that none is sufficient,”64 is, I contend, a side effect of the 
comparator analysis’s dominance and the skepticism toward discrimination 
claims that emerges from that dominance.65 
 
62.  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Justice O’Connor wrote that “stray remarks in the 
workplace, . . . statements by nondecisiomakers, and statements by decisionmakers 
unrelated to the decisional process itself” should not be treated as proving the connection 
between an employer’s acts and the protected trait. 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see also id. at 251 (majority opinion) (“Remarks at work that are based on sex 
stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment 
decision.”). 
63.  Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1216 (11th Cir. 2008). In the case, which 
was brought under the Fair Housing Act, neighbors and city commissioners had made 
statements about not wanting recovering drug users in their town, but the court deemed the 
statements irrelevant because of the absence of a comparator. Id.  
64.  Sullivan, supra note 3, at 216 n.93.  
65.  This compartmentalization effect is even more notable because it runs contrary to the 
Court’s suggestion that all evidence must be taken together in evaluating a discrimination 
claim. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000) 
(identifying as relevant, inter alia, the “strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the 
probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence 
that supports the employer’s case”). 
For a critique of the stray-remarks doctrine, see, for example, Catherine Albiston et al., 
Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping 
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A. The Comparator Default and First-Generation Cases 
The comparator demand’s inhibiting effect on first-generation 
discrimination claims can be seen in five primary ways. In many cases, 
potentially comparable coworkers are not seen as sufficiently comparable 
because of job responsibilities or workplace performance issues. In others, 
potential comparators are seen as insufficiently probative because of concerns 
about small sample size. In still others, the comparators are not seen as 
probative because the individual bringing the claim has a unique position in 
the workplace, works in an environment that is homogeneous with respect to 
the relevant trait, or has a trait-related aspect of identity, such as pregnancy, 
that is treated as inherently not comparable to others outside the trait-bearing 
group. 
1. No Sufficiently Comparable Coworkers 
Most commonly, the comparator default blocks discrimination claims 
because courts find that there is no individual sufficiently comparable to the 
employee-plaintiff to show that the protected characteristic, rather than some 
other factor, was the reason for the challenged adverse treatment.66 Often, this 
 
Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1293-96 (2008). These authors argue that “[s]ocial science 
research has shown the value of ‘stray remarks’ as providing a window into the hidden 
biases in the workplace,” id. at 1293, and that “[a]s social science research mounts and more 
courts acknowledge that ‘[c]ontext matters’—indeed it matters a lot—in these cases, the 
‘stray remarks’ doctrine may be cast aside,” id. at 1296 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006)). 
66.  For example, in Holifield v. Reno, the court stated: 
Holifield has failed to produce sufficient affirmative evidence to establish 
that the non-minority employees with whom he compares his treatment were 
similarly situated in all aspects, or that their conduct was of comparable 
seriousness to the conduct for which he was discharged. Having failed to meet his 
burden of proving he was similarly situated to a more favorably treated employee, 
Holifield has not established a prima facie case. 
  115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1997); see also LaFary v. Rogers Grp., Inc., 591 F.3d 903, 909 
(7th Cir. 2010) (finding that a coworker who took leave that was comparable to the leave 
taken by the pregnancy discrimination plaintiff was not similarly situated based on the 
employer’s needs at the time when the coworker was rehired but the plaintiff was not); 
Senske v. Sybase, Inc., 588 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting an age discrimination 
claim for lack of an adequate comparator while observing that “[a]lthough the ‘similarly 
situated’ concept is a flexible one, the comparators must be similar enough that differences 
in their treatment cannot be explained by other variables, such as distinctions in their roles 
or performance histories” (citing Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2007))); White 
v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 343 F. App’x 532, 535 (11th Cir. 2009) 
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is because the plaintiff’s best evidence comes from a comparison to an 
employee with a different supervisor67 or with insufficiently similar job 
responsibilities68 or, in the case of a challenge to disparate enforcement of a 
disciplinary rule, to an employee not subject to the same disciplinary 
standards.69 Although the circuits vary somewhat in how they characterize the 
match between comparators and the plaintiff, with some requiring that 
comparators be “similarly situated in [all] material respects”70 and others 
 
(“[W]hile [the plaintiff] may have shown that some non-minority individuals had isolated 
issues in their backgrounds, he failed to identify any such individual that had the same 
number of problems in [as] many areas as he had.” (third alteration in original) (internal 
citation omitted)); Lewis v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 343 F. App’x 450, 454 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (rejecting a comparator in a race discrimination case and stating that “[w]e 
‘require that the quantity and quality of the comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to 
prevent courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples 
with oranges’”) (quoting Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 
2006)). 
67.  See, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398 (10th Cir. 1997). Aramburu held that 
“‘[s]imilarly situated employees,’” for the purpose of showing disparate treatment in 
employee discipline, “‘are those who deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the 
same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.’” Id. at 1404 (quoting 
Wilson v. Utica Park Clinic, Inc., 76 F.3d 394, No. 95-5060, 1996 WL 50462, at *1 (10th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 1996)). The Sixth Circuit has stated: 
[T]o be deemed “similarly-situated”, the individuals with whom the plaintiff 
seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, 
have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct 
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish 
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it. 
Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 
964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). However, in its recent decision in Sprint/United 
Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008), the Court declined to embrace a 
categorical rule regarding whether evidence of discrimination had to come from 
comparators with the same supervisor. 
68.  For example, in addressing a sex discrimination claim by a female secretary, the Second 
Circuit wrote, “Given their quite different positions, no rational inference of disparate 
treatment on the basis of gender could be drawn from evidence that [two male employees] 
were not given the secretarial-type tasks assigned to” the female plaintiff. Galdieri-
Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 1998). 
69.  See, e.g., Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that, in 
the disciplinary context, comparators must “‘have been subject to the same standards and 
[must] have engaged in the same conduct without . . . differentiating or mitigating 
circumstances’” (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th 
Cir. 1998))). 
70.  See Perkins v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 78 F.3d 747, 751 (1st Cir. 1996). See generally  
Tricia M. Beckles, Comment, Class of One: Are Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs at an 
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insisting on “nearly identical” comparators,71 all agree that the fit must be 
tight.72 
As this set of cases reveals, the comparator heuristic might work well for 
observing discrimination in large, Tayloresque workplaces, where multiple 
workers engage in tasks that are susceptible to relatively straightforward 
comparison.73 Indeed, the very point of Taylor’s Shop Management was to 
remove “[a]ll possible brain work . . . from the shop and center[]” the work 
with managers.74 By reducing jobs to specific tasks and standardizing 
supervision, Taylor prompted a shift in the workplace so that workers who had 
once been skilled in a variety of aspects of production and supervision were 
 
Insurmountable Disadvantage if They Have No “Similarly Situated” Comparators?, 10 U. PA. J. 
BUS. & EMP. L. 459, 470-72 (2008) (reviewing the standards set out in several circuits). 
71.  As the Sixth Circuit wrote in the context of a disparate discipline complaint: 
[T]he “comparables” [must be] similarly-situated in all respects. . . . [They] must 
have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and 
have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating 
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment 
of them for it. 
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Nix v. WLCY 
Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] plaintiff fired for 
misconduct makes out a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge if he shows that he is a 
member of a protected class, that he was qualified for the job from which he was fired, and 
‘that the misconduct for which [he] was discharged was nearly identical to that engaged in by 
[an employee outside the protected class] whom [the employer] retained.’” (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (quoting Davin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 678 F.2d 567, 570 (5th 
Cir. Unit B 1982))). 
72.  In the separate but related context of whether comparative proof is sufficiently probative to 
show that discrimination accounted for the selection of someone other than the plaintiff, the 
Supreme Court rejected a lower court demand that the difference between comparators 
must be “‘so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.’” Ash v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006) (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. 
App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005)). At the same time, the Court endorsed other demanding 
characterizations of the comparator requirement. See id. at 457-58 (citing Cooper v. Southern 
Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “disparities in qualifications must be of 
such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial 
judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in 
question”); Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that qualifications evidence alone could establish pretext where the plaintiff’s 
qualifications are “clearly superior” to those of the candidate selected); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. 
Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (concluding that pretext can be inferred 
if “a reasonable employer would have found the plaintiff to be significantly better qualified 
for the job”). For characterizations of the comparator requirement after Ash, see also supra 
note 66. 
73.  See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, SHOP MANAGEMENT 50 (1911). 
74.  Id. at 34. 
  
the yale law journal  120: 728   2 011  
756 
 
now performing a narrower set of routine—and easily comparable—tasks. 
Within this system, whose very design aimed to create comparable jobs and 
workers, the turn to comparators as a means of demonstrating discrimination 
might have been imperfect but was surely viable in many instances. 
Today, however, the workplace barely resembles its Taylor-inspired 
predecessor. As Katherine Stone has observed, jobs are now “defined in terms 
of competencies” and employees are valued, not for their fungible skill sets, but 
for “their varied skills and flexibility.”75 In addition, “[t]he decentralization of 
authority and the flattening of hierarchy” obscures what were previously clear 
lines of authority, making it increasingly difficult to “locat[e] the responsible 
party in the face of decentralized and dispersed decision-making.”76 Given the 
flexible and dynamic nature of many contemporary jobs, the insistence on 
comparators seems starkly mismatched with the work world as it currently 
operates. 
2. Small Sample Size 
In other instances, the difficulty is that courts, while insisting on 
comparators, are skeptical of the selected comparators’ probative value because 
of concerns about sample size.77 As a federal district court observed in a race 
and sex discrimination case brought by a black woman who worked as a 
civilian for the Army, “The generally small sample size and lack of historical 
data further undermined the evidentiary value of the statistics” showing that 
black women were underrepresented in senior-grade Army positions.78 In 
 
75.  See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 165 (2004); see also Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a 
New Paradigm of Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 516 (2005-2006) (describing 
“[f]lexibility and mobility” as “hav[ing] replaced predictability and stability as core values in 
business organization”). 
76.  STONE, supra note 75, at 165-66. 
77.  For discussion of the particular challenges that sample size concerns present for individuals 
who bring discrimination claims based on more than one protected characteristic, see infra 
notes 118-123 and accompanying text. Even in less complex, first-generation cases, sample-
size issues can be impediments for individuals bringing discrimination claims. 
78.  Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). In a Seventh Circuit case, Judge 
Posner elaborated on an aspect of this sample size issue in a case brought by black female 
students who argued that they were punished more harshly for hazing sorority pledges than 
were comparable white students, where he rejected the proffered comparators as inadequate. 
He observed: 
In a large number of dissimilar cases, if there were reason to think the 
dissimilarities were randomly distributed and therefore canceled out, an inference 
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systemic disparate treatment challenges, the Court has similarly observed that 
small sample sizes produce statistical analyses with little probative value.79 In 
other words, when an employee relies on comparative evidence but is either 
alone or one of few with his or her protected trait, courts have been skeptical 
that the protected identity trait, rather than a quirk of the employee, is the 
reason for the adverse action. 
Current iterations of intersectionality theory suggest that this sort of 
skepticism about the revelatory effects of comparison would be well founded 
for all comparisons rather than just in cases where individuals present 
intersectional discrimination claims. Because all individuals have 
multidimensional aspects of their identities, very close comparisons are almost 
always hard to come by.80 In this sense, the comparator analysis can be seen as 
mismatched not only with today’s workplaces, as suggested above, but also 
with contemporary understandings of identity. 
3. Uniquely Situated Employees 
In addition to the difficulties that arise where potential comparators may 
actually exist in a workplace, there are several types of first-generation cases in 
which there are simply no comparators from which to choose. In some cases, 
an employee’s position is unique, particularly with regard to high-level 
employees who cannot credibly claim that their responsibilities are closely 
 
of discrimination might be drawn. And likewise in a small sample if the cases 
were identical except for a racial difference. But in a very small sample of 
dissimilar cases, the presence of a racial difference does not permit an inference of 
discrimination; there are too many other differences, and in so small a sample no 
basis for thinking they cancel out. 
Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2008). Courts are often skeptical of data 
drawn from small samples. See Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d 1072, 1076 
(9th Cir. 1986) (“The problem with [a small sample size] is that slight changes in the data 
can drastically alter appearances.”); Contreras v. City of L.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 n.4 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (“Statistics are not trustworthy when minor numerical variations produce 
significant percentage fluctuations.”); Morita v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 541 F.2d 217, 
220 (9th Cir. 1976) (“‘[S]tatistical evidence derived from an extremely small universe . . . 
has little predictive value and must be disregarded.’” (quoting Harper v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975))). 
79.  See N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979); see also Mayor of Phila. 
v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974) (criticizing “the simplistic percentage 
comparisons” used by the court of appeals as “lack[ing] real meaning in the context of [the] 
case” and affirming “the District Court’s concern for the smallness of the sample”).  
80.  For additional discussion of intersectionality theory, see infra notes 112-123 and 
accompanying text. 
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comparable to those of anyone else in the firm.81 One comment cites the “class 
of one” of Carleton Fiorina, who lost her position as president and chief 
executive officer of Hewlett-Packard and, had she wanted to bring a sex 
discrimination claim, would have been precluded if required to show a 
comparator.82 This difficulty also arises in other settings, such as academia, 
where an employee is often the only specialist in his or her field and is thus 
uniquely situated in terms of both work product and related responsibilities.83 
More generally, in a knowledge-based economy, the blurring of lines 
between higher- and lower-level jobs increasingly precludes employees from 
finding comparators. As a result, even employees who are less senior will often 
hold a unique position and will similarly find themselves without a 
comparator.84 In addition, for contractual or other reasons, “cases occasionally 
arise where a plaintiff cannot show disparate treatment only because there are 
no employees similarly situated to the plaintiff.”85 In one of those cases, Pan 
Am pilots who had joined Delta Air Lines were not positioned similarly to any 
 
81.  See, e.g., Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[There] are only a limited 
number of potential ‘similarly situated employees’ when higher level supervisory positions 
for medical doctors are involved.”). 
82.  Beckles, supra note 70, at 472. 
83.  See, e.g., Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law’s Failure To Protect Women 
Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67 (1994) (analyzing the ways in which federal discrimination 
laws have failed to protect women faculty members from discrimination in higher education 
institutions). 
84.  See, e.g., Sylva-Kalonji v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. 08-0207-KD, 2009 WL 1418808, at *6 
(S.D. Ala. May 20, 2009) (finding a proposed comparator inadequate where the plaintiff, a 
data clerk, and the proposed comparator each performed “unique duties”). But see Jackson v. 
FedEx Corporate Servs., Inc., 518 F.3d 388, 396-97 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding the failure to 
identify an identically situated comparator not fatal to Title VII claim where the plaintiff 
worked in a “unique position”). 
85.  Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001). In that case, the court 
found that former Pan Am pilots who joined Delta Airlines had made out a prima facie case 
of age discrimination, even though they had no comparator pilots, but ultimately found that 
the Pan Am pilots failed to rebut the nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the airline for 
their action. On the comparator point, the court wrote: 
While Delta is a long way from the days when it had only a single employee, the 
488 Plaintiffs in this case find themselves in a similar conundrum: they are in a 
class all by themselves. Because all the Pan Am pilots hired by Delta were 
subjected to the same three employment terms challenged in this action, and 
because the Pan Am pilots differed materially from the pre-APA Delta pilots in 
terms of their airline of origin and career expectations, there are no Delta 
employees similarly situated to Plaintiffs who did not suffer the adverse 
employment actions. 
Id. at 467-68. 
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others for purposes of their age discrimination claim because of the nature of 
the agreements accompanying their hire. Thus, again, we see the lack of fit 
between the comparator demand and the structure of many, if not most, 
contemporary jobs. 
In addition, the plaintiff’s particular situation with respect to workplace 
conduct or performance might be distinctive enough to make it hard to come 
by another comparable employee, even if the workplace has potential 
comparators in it. In one pregnancy discrimination case, for example, an 
employee was fired for excessive tardiness the day before her maternity leave 
was set to begin and lost her case because she presented no evidence that 
comparable employees were treated differently.86 The Seventh Circuit, per 
Judge Posner, indicated that Ms. Troupe might have prevailed had she 
presented a comparator such as a “Mr. Troupe, who [was] as tardy as Ms. 
Troupe was, also because of health problems, and who [was] about to take a 
protracted sick leave growing out of those problems” at the employer’s 
expense.87 The court went on to express “doubt that finding a comparison 
group would be that difficult.”88 Perhaps that particular employer had fired 
many regularly tardy workers on the verge of taking extended sick leaves, but 
in most, if not all, workplaces, the comparator would be far more difficult to 
identify than Judge Posner suggests. Indeed, the Third Circuit acknowledged 
this difficulty when denying the pregnancy discrimination claim of a woman 
who was fired while absent on maternity leave. Finding that the plaintiff had 
not identified an adequate comparator, the court added that “[o]f course, it 
was difficult for her to make such a showing because Carnegie never has had an 
employee on disability leave for a protracted period for a reason other than 
pregnancy.”89 
4. Homogeneous Workplaces 
In other cases, the lack of comparators arises because the relevant part of 
the workplace is homogeneous, in the sense that all potentially comparable 
workers share the same trait that is the basis for the discrimination claim. In 
those settings, a comparator regime will not recognize most forms of 
 
86.  Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the plaintiff 
had not presented a comparator to substantiate her discrimination claim). 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at 739. 
89.  In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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discrimination.90 Yet this type of segregation in the workplace remains 
widespread, which means that the comparator demand leaves large swaths of 
employment outside the reach of discrimination protections. Sex-segregated 
jobs, for example, are particularly common.91 In one illustrative case, all of the 
relevant secretaries were female, which led the Second Circuit to reject a 
secretary’s sex discrimination case because no comparator existed. “[A]lthough 
she complains that she was treated less favorably than two employees who held 
positions comparable to her secretarial position,” the court wrote, “both of 
those employees were women.”92 From this, the court concluded that “[t]here 
was no evidence that [the plaintiff] was treated differently because of her 
gender.”93 Likewise, in a sex discrimination case brought by a mother with 
young children whose request to be scheduled in a different time slot was 
denied after she submitted a transfer request, the court held that “to establish a 
prima facie case based on a ‘sex plus’ theory of employment discrimination, the 
plaintiff must show that similarly situated men were treated differently than 
women.”94 Her claim failed because she could not provide a comparator in the 
form of a man with young children; there were no such men in her workplace. 
 
90.  As noted earlier and discussed in depth below, see infra Section IV.A, comparators are 
typically not required for sexual harassment claims, so it is possible that a claim of that sort 
would be recognized even in a homogeneous environment. 
91.  For a global analysis of sex-based occupational segregation, see MARIA CHARLES & DAVID B. 
GRUSKY, OCCUPATIONAL GHETTOS: THE WORLDWIDE SEGREGATION OF WOMEN AND MEN 
(2004). 
92.  Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 291 (2d Cir. 1998). As Vicki 
Schultz has explained in exploring the way that “lack of interest” arguments have been used 
to justify sex-based differences in employment, a homogeneous workplace does not 
necessarily indicate the absence of troubling gender bias. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories 
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII 
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990). 
93.  Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 291. 
94.  Hess-Watson v. Potter, No. Civ.A. 703CV00389, 2004 WL 34833, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 4, 
2004); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1086 (3d Cir. 
1996) (stating that there would be insufficient evidence of gender discrimination against a 
male employee who was denied a promotion that was subsequently awarded to a female 
employee where “there is evidence that the decisionmaker was a man and that the great 
majority of the employees in the job category at issue were men”). But see Lewis v. 
Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 2010) (denying summary 
judgment in a sex discrimination case where sex-stereotyping remarks had been made but 
the plaintiff-employee lacked a male comparator). 
  
discrimination by comparison 
761 
 
The comparator demand has similarly been a barrier to discrimination 
claims in racially homogeneous workplaces. Typical is this observation in a 
discrimination case brought by an employee of Nigerian origin that was 
affirmed by the Second Circuit: “[T]he other unit . . . caseworkers were all 
African, so while Adeniji was the only person . . . assigned homemaking work 
while the others were assigned protective diagnostic work and homemaking 
work . . . he cannot claim that employees outside the Title VII protected class 
were treated differently than those within the protected class.”95 
5. Pregnancy, Breastfeeding, and the Nonexistent Comparator 
Finally there are the pregnancy- and breastfeeding-related cases in which 
there can be no precise comparator by reason of the different reproductive 
capacities of men and women, and in which other comparators are generally 
not entertained by courts.96 Most notorious, perhaps, is the Supreme Court’s 
distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant people that led the Court to 
conclude that pregnancy discrimination did not amount to sex discrimination 
in Geduldig v. Aiello.97 When this distinction first appeared, the question was 
whether California’s exclusion of pregnancy from the state disability program’s 
coverage violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court saw the problem in 
this way: 
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such 
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory 
analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups—
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is 
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.98  
 
95.  Adeniji v. Admin. for Children Servs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 407, 426 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citation 
omitted); see also Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1997) (treating 
the fact that eighty-eight percent of the defendant’s workforce were minorities as evidence 
against the plaintiff’s race discrimination claim). But see Legrand v. Trs. of Univ. of Ark., 821 
F.2d 478, 480 (8th Cir. 1987) (reversing as legal error a district court ruling that plaintiffs 
had failed to establish a prima facie case because “the overwhelming majority of employees 
in the Physical Plant is black”). 
96.  These cases, which present some of the most interesting questions related to the role of the 
comparator heuristic, are also discussed below. See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying 
text. 
97.  417 U.S. 484 (1974).  
98.  Id. at 496 n.20. And again: “There is no risk from which men are protected and women are 
not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.” Id. at 
496-97. 
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The Court took the same approach to a claim that pregnancy 
discrimination amounted to sex discrimination under Title VII, reinforcing 
that the relevant comparison was between “pregnant women and nonpregnant 
persons.”99 Consequently, “[a]s a matter of law, at that time, ‘an exclusion of 
pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan providing general coverage [was] not 
a gender-based discrimination at all.’”100 While Congress overrode the Court’s 
conclusion in Gilbert with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,101 which amended 
Title VII’s definition of sex to include pregnancy-based distinctions, the point 
for our purposes is that the comparator heuristic missed the possibility, 
recognized by both the dissent102 and Congress, that the lack of a comparator 
did not necessarily mean the absence of discrimination. 
Sex discrimination challenges that have been brought related to 
breastfeeding rules have fared about as well as those in Geduldig and Gilbert, 
with courts finding that the absence of a comparator for breastfeeding women 
rendered it unreasonable to see the rules as discriminatory based on sex. In a 
decision derided by commentators,103 but representative of other decisions in 
this area, the Sixth Circuit sustained Wal-Mart’s ban on breastfeeding in 
 
99.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 
n.20). 
100.  AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2009) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 
136). 
101.  Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978, expanding the definition of 
“sex” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include unequal treatment “because of or 
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 
Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)). 
102.  Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n reaching its conclusion that a 
showing of purposeful discrimination has not been made . . . the Court simply disregards a 
history of General Electric practices that have served to undercut the employment 
opportunities of women who become pregnant while employed.”). 
103.  See, e.g., Katherine A. Macfarlane, Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores: Another Door Shut—A 
Federal Interpretation Excluding Breastfeeding from the Scope of a State’s Sex Discrimination 
Protection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2319, 2322 (2005) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit’s analysis . . . stymies 
the natural expansion of sex discrimination protection.”); Elizabeth Hildebrand Matherne, 
The Lactating Angel or Activist? Public Breastfeeding as Symbolic Speech, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 121, 133-34 (2008) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s decision “leaves breastfeeding mothers 
vulnerable in their everyday lives and pushes them back into the home by making the world 
so uncomfortable and full of potential confrontations”); Brianne Whelan, For Crying Out 
Loud: Ohio’s Legal Battle with Public Breastfeeding and Hope for the Future, 13 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 669, 673-74, 678 n.44 (2005) (analyzing an Ohio bill, H.B. 554, 
125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004), proposed in response to Derungs, that would 
allow a “mother . . . to breast-feed her baby in any location of a place of public 
accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is permitted”). 
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public areas of the store against a state law sex discrimination claim.104 The 
court insisted that a comparator analysis be followed, holding that “for there to 
be impermissible sex discrimination, there must be one gender that is treated 
differently than another.”105 Continuing, the court explained that no sex 
discrimination had occurred because the only prohibition Wal-Mart imposed 
was on a type of feeding that only women could do, and there was, therefore, 
no class for comparison.106 The court also pointed out that the same insistence 
on a comparator had doomed several other challenges to breastfeeding-related 
restrictions, including one where a federal district court had found that “the 
lack of a similarly-situated class of men was fatal to the plaintiff’s [Title VII] 
claim: ‘if there is no comparable subclass of members of the opposite gender, 
the requisite comparison to the opposite gender is impossible.’”107 Of the 
numerous district and appellate court cases it reviewed related to breastfeeding 
restrictions, none “found that breast-feeding fell within the scope of gender 
discrimination because of the absence of a comparable class.”108 
Thus, a conceptualization that recognizes discrimination only in the 
presence of a comparator will simply not observe discrimination even in cases, 
like many of those just discussed, that fall well within widely accepted, 
first-generation theories of discrimination. Indeed, in some of these settings, 
the comparator requirement’s very design forecloses recognition of the 
possibility that discrimination might have occurred, including in homogeneous 
work environments and situations where women and men are seen as being 
categorically different from one another.109 That is, by demanding that 
plaintiffs produce a comparator to have a viable case, courts have transformed 
the comparator methodology into the substantive law of discrimination. 
Because that method, as applied, allows for only a narrow set of circumstances 
 
104.  Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2004). 
105.  Id. at 437. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. at 439 (emphasis added) (quoting Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
108.  Id. (emphasis added). 
109.  While these cases involving discrimination claims because of a particular aspect of the lives 
of many women, such as reproduction or childcare, could fit within the discussion of 
second-generation claims as well, I include them here because they were framed as relatively 
straightforward discrimination cases yet were barred, nonetheless, by the comparator 
demand. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (questioning whether the 
recognition of differences between men and women related to reproductive capacity as 
categorical overstates the difference between socially constructed and biologically rooted 
gendered distinctions). 
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to be considered discriminatory, the law of discrimination has, in effect, been 
narrowed as well. 
B. The Comparator Heuristic’s Flaws as Amplified in Second-Generation Cases 
Not surprisingly, if finding an adequate comparator is difficult in a 
“simple” discrimination case, where an individual alleges that he or she was 
treated differently because of his or her protected trait, then the task becomes 
even more daunting when a claim rests on a more complex understanding of 
identity or the surrounding workplace structures. Many of the problems posed 
by the comparator demand in these cases echo those just discussed. Still, the 
ways in which they manifest render nearly all second-generation cases 
nonviable, reinforcing the starkness of the disconnect between these newer 
theories of discrimination and the existing comparator-focused 
jurisprudence.110 Hence their separate treatment here.111 
1. Intersectionality 
Among the various cases that track intersectionality theory’s insights, the 
simplest are known as trait-plus cases, in which an employer imposes a rule on 
members of one group in a workplace based on a combination of their 
protected trait and some other unprotected attribute, such as having young 
children or being married to a fellow employee. An early case in this area, 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., signaled the possibility of success for an 
individual who could show, via an explicit policy such as a bar on employment 
applications from women with small children, that an employer had treated a 
subset of employees adversely because of a protected trait.112 Absent an 
explicitly discriminatory policy, however, an individual is typically required to 
produce a comparator to show that the adverse treatment is trait-based. This 
means that the individual must identify a coworker who not only has 
comparable job responsibilities and lacks the same protected trait but also has 
the same unprotected attribute, such as parental or marital status. 
 
110.  The last Part of this Article returns to this disconnect to discuss alternate methodologies that 
have the potential to be inclusive of the thicker, second-generation conceptualizations of 
discrimination. 
111.  Even for those who would not characterize the circumstances described below as involving 
discrimination, it is useful to see the similarities in the ways in which the comparator 
demand affects consideration of both these and first-generation types of claims. 
112.  400 U.S. 542 (1971). In Martin Marietta, there was a clear comparator group of men with 
small children whose applications were not barred by the challenged rule. Id. at 544. 
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Given the difficulties associated with finding an adequate comparator in the 
simplest of circumstances, as described earlier, there are likely to be even fewer, 
if any, close comparators in these kinds of cases.113 Consider, for example, the 
Tenth Circuit’s rejection of a sex discrimination claim by an airport custodian 
shift supervisor who alleged that she was treated worse than the male shift 
supervisors when she was fired because her husband, whom she supervised, 
was reported to have left his workplace during his shift.114 The court cited a 
litany of cases for the proposition that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be 
successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the opposite 
gender.”115 Adding that “[s]uch plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing 
that they were treated differently from similarly situated members of the 
opposite gender,”116 the court found that Ms. Coleman’s claim failed because 
she could not show that the employer treated her “differently from men who 
also were married to subordinate employees.”117 
More complicated still are the situations in which an individual claims 
discrimination based on more than one protected category. These 
intersectional or multidimensional claims arise when an individual seeks to 
show that the employer discriminated because of the individual’s particular 
combination of traits, rather than simply trying to show that the employer 
discriminated on two distinct grounds.118 As one court explained in connection 
 
113.  The challenge here is thus somewhat similar to the challenge for the “unique” Mrs. Troupe 
in the pregnancy-leave discrimination case described above. See supra text accompanying 
notes 87-89. 
114.  Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997). 
115.  Id. at 1204. As the court also explained, in a “plus”-type case, “although the protected class 
need not include all women, the plaintiff must still prove that the subclass of women was 
unfavorably treated as compared to the corresponding subclass of men.” Id. at 1203. 
116.  Id. at 1204.  
117.  Id. at 1205. 
118.  See, e.g., Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 653-55 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting) (stating that a comment about the plaintiff having a “typical Hispanic macho 
attitude” and others like it showed “particularly offensive stereotypes about Hispanics as 
lazy, and about Hispanic males as aggressive and domineering” and finding that the 
remarks and other conduct stated a claim “as to whether [the plaintiff] was subjected to an 
abusive workplace because of his race and his sex”); Anthony v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 898 F. 
Supp. 1435, 1445 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (denying defendants’ summary judgment motion and 
stating that “the epithet ‘black bitch’ cannot be designated exclusively as either racist or 
sexist”); see also Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that 
African-American women did not constitute a discrete class for the purposes of a Title VII 
suit); DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) 
(“[T]his lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, 
  
the yale law journal  120: 728   2 011  
766 
 
with a suit brought by an Asian woman, for example, “Asian women are 
subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men 
nor by white women” so the absence of evidence of discrimination against 
Asian men or white women would not disprove the plaintiff’s claim.119 
Most courts exclude as possible comparators anyone who shares any of the 
protected characteristics that form the basis of the plaintiff’s claim,120 so that 
finding a comparator for an intersectional claimant is even more difficult than 
it is for individuals who base their claim on one protected characteristic. As one 
court explained, “[T]he more specific the composite class in which the plaintiff 
claims membership, the more onerous th[e] ultimate burden” of proving 
discrimination becomes.121 Thus, even if anecdotal and social science evidence 
reveals the real experience of intersectional discrimination,122 it will usually be 
impossible, as a practical matter, for an individual to find his or her negative 
mirror image to show that discrimination has occurred. As a result, as one 
commentator has observed, “courts have basically given up on the complex 
subject.”123 
2. Identity Performance 
A second type of complex case for which the comparator demand inhibits 
the observation of discrimination is the identity performance case. In 
developing the idea that “[w]orkplace discrimination is driven by more than 
 
sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.”), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977). 
119.  Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994); see also id. (“[T]he attempt to 
bisect a person’s identity at the intersection of race and gender often distorts or ignores the 
particular nature of their experiences.”); Jefferies v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 
F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The essence of Jefferies’ argument is that an employer 
should not escape from liability for discrimination against black females by a showing that it 
does not discriminate against blacks and that it does not discriminate against females.”); 
Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1475 (describing Lam as “one of very few ‘plus’ claims to have met 
success”). 
120.  See Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1491-92; cf. Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-
CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (“Courts are split . . . 
over whether the proper comparator may only include a person outside of the protected 
class who has the same ‘plus characteristic’ as the plaintiff (in this case, a male with young 
children) or whether the comparator may include any person (male or female) who lacks the 
‘plus’ characteristic (in this case, a female without young children).”). 
121.  Jeffers v. Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 327 (D. Md. 2003). 
122.  See Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1446 & n.22 (discussing sources). 
123.  Id. at 1462.  
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the physiological markers of outsider difference,”124 Devon Carbado and Mitu 
Gulati observed that outsiders who want to succeed in a workplace “often find 
themselves having to do extra work to make themselves palatable and their 
insider employers comfortable.”125 Addressing clothing and hairstyle choices, 
language use, and styles of socializing, Carbado and Gulati identify “strategic 
passing,” “comforting,” “using prejudice,” and other strategies as existing 
along this continuum of identity work.126 Those who do not engage in these 
“comfort strategies” may find themselves out of work or outside the 
partnership track. 
In considering what a discrimination claim on these grounds might look 
like, Carbado and Gulati offer the example of the “fifth black woman” who 
presents herself, through her choices about clothing and socializing, in ways 
more associated with African-Americans than do four other black female 
colleagues.127 Ultimately, the four others get promoted but the fifth black 
woman does not, although all have produced comparable work. The question 
for purposes here becomes whether a court could recognize race discrimination 
in that set of facts, which indicate that the fifth employee’s nonpromotion was 
because of the way she performed her race. Even if the fifth black woman could 
produce a comparator from outside of her demographic group, such as a white 
 
124.  Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21, at 1307; see also Green, Work Culture, supra note 23, at 628 
(“[S]etting behavioral expectations along a white, male norm imposes extra performance 
costs on outsiders and forces reconstruction of identity.”); Gowri Ramachandran, 
Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor 
Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 300 (2005) (“[N]egotiating multiple identity performance 
demands simultaneously often places intersectionals in a uniquely restricted situation, one 
that has been referred to in other contexts as a ‘catch 22’ or ‘double bind.’”); Camille Gear 
Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1199-1230, 1269 (2004) (arguing that interpretations of Title VII 
that “fail to account for the role that volitional behavior or race/ethnicity performance plays 
in defining individual identity” leave courts unable to reach “equitable resolution” of 
discrimination claims); Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling at 
Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369, 378-86 (2007) (discussing “[i]dentity 
[p]erformance as a [s]trategic [r]esponse to [w]orkplace [c]ultural [p]rofiling”); Kimberly 
A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 369 (2006) (“This paper seeks to begin the process of defining the 
ways in which employers use trait discrimination so as to begin a more useful normative 
discussion about when, if ever, antidiscrimination law should prohibit such 
discrimination.”). 
125.  Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21, at 1307. 
126.  Id. at 1299-1307. 
127.  See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
701, 714-19 (2001). 
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man, the promotion of four “comparable” peers who are similar with respect to 
their race and sex (that is, the protected traits on which a claim might be filed) 
would likely be treated as undermining any inference of discrimination a 
factfinder might otherwise draw from the comparison.128 There may well be 
other strategies for illuminating the possibility that the employer acted with 
discriminatory intent, as will be discussed shortly, but comparison will be 
unavailing. 
Perhaps the most classic illustration of identity-performance discrimination 
from case law is Rogers v. American Airlines, in which a federal district court 
rejected a claim that the airline’s prohibition of cornrows amounted to race 
discrimination.129 “[E]ven if socioculturally associated with a particular race or 
nationality,” the court wrote, the hairstyle “is not an impermissible basis for 
distinctions in the application of employment practices by an employer.”130 The 
Rogers analysis has since been repeated by numerous courts, which have 
rejected employees’ claims that employer restrictions on or comments about 
personal appearance choices amount to trait-based discrimination.131 In a case 
 
128.  See, e.g., Smith v. Planas, 975 F. Supp. 303, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Five of the seven 
individuals identified by Plaintiff as having received higher-paying assignments were 
black—members of Plaintiff’s protected class. As such, Plaintiff has failed to make out a 
prima facie case of race discrimination because he cannot show that the adverse employment 
action taken against him occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of race 
discrimination.”); Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 94-CV-8645, 1997 WL 
253209, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1997) (finding that an African-American woman failed to 
articulate a prima facie case for race discrimination because, as two of her alleged 
comparators were African-American men, she “[could not] show that the adverse 
employment action taken against her . . . occurred in circumstances giving rise to an 
inference of race discrimination”). But see, e.g., Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 43 
(2d Cir. 2000) (“[Because] Title VII’s principal focus is on protecting individuals, rather 
than a protected class as a whole, an employer may not escape liability . . . simply because it 
can prove it treated other members of the employee’s group favorably.”). 
129.  527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Rogers argued that the grooming policy “discriminate[d] 
against her as a woman, and more specifically as a black woman.” Id. at 231; see also id. at 
231-32 (quoting Rogers’s contention that the cornrow style “‘has been, historically, a fashion 
and style adopted by Black American women’”). Scores of articles have analyzed the Rogers 
decision and the racial nature of the airline’s selective hairstyle restriction. See, e.g., Paulette 
Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365; 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title 
VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010). 
130.  Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232. 
131.  See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing 
numerous cases to support the conclusion that sex-based hair length rules do not violate sex 
discrimination prohibitions); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 
1899306, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (finding that a theme park employer’s ban on 
dreadlocks and cornrows did not amount to race discrimination in part because “the policy 
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against the United Parcel Service, for example, a driver alleged racial 
discrimination and harassment in connection with comments about his 
dreadlocks, which he associated with his African identity as well as his religious 
beliefs.132 Among other comments, UPS managers told him he looked like 
Stevie Wonder, equated his hair with drug use, and more.133 Yet the court 
concluded that race was not implicated. “These comments and abuse,” the 
court wrote, “while hurtful, sophomoric and insulting, are not racist in nature 
and do not support a reasonable inference of racial discrimination.”134 Likewise, 
another district court found that an employer’s conduct was harassing but not 
racially motivated when he criticized an African American employee’s 
hairstyles, “commented ‘it’s a black thing’ one day when Miller was discussing 
her hair and fingernails with a white female co-worker,” and asked her, among 
other similar questions, whether she was going to the zoo or to the jungles of 
Nigeria when she wore an animal-print top.135 
In these cases, the comparator demand plays what might be described as a 
supporting role in limiting the discrimination theory’s reach. Although courts 
are generally dismissive of grooming code discrimination claims as restrictions 
on “personal preference” rather than identity,136 they also take the absence of 
comparators to reinforce the absence of discriminatory intent. For example, in 
Eatman, the court observed that the driver “ha[d] not identified any specific 
similarly situated non-black employee who was not disciplined for violating 
the hair appearance guideline.”137 It added, in response to the driver’s showing 
that seventeen of the eighteen affected employees were black, that this 
 
applies to all races and there is no evidence that the policy was enforced only against 
African-Americans”); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 n.4 (N.D. 
Ind. 1998) (citing Rogers to sustain store’s sex-based hair length rules); see also Jespersen v. 
Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (sustaining sex-based 
grooming code restrictions against a sex discrimination claim); Austin, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 
1256 (holding, with respect to a grooming code, that “discrimination based on factors of 
personal preference” does “not necessarily restrict employment opportunities and thus” is 
“not forbidden”). 
132.  Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Thanks to 
Kimberly Yuracko for discussion of Eatman and some of the other contemporary identity 
performance cases noted here. 
133.  Id. at 261, 264. 
134.  Id. at 265. 
135.  Miller v. CCC Info. Sys., Inc., No. 95 C 6612, 1996 WL 480370, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 
1996). Miller had argued that the hairstyle and clothing comments “were ‘racial’ because 
white people do not wear their hair in the same style.” Id. at *3.  
136.  See, e.g., Austin, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. 
137.  Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
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circumstantial evidence “would not, on its own, reasonably support a finding 
of discriminatory intent against African Americans.”138 Likewise, in Rogers, 
even while the court stressed that “[a]n all-braided hair style is an ‘easily 
changed characteristic,’” it bolstered its argument by observing that the 
cornrows ban “applies equally to members of all races.”139 
3. Structural Discrimination 
In a third situation—where workplace norms, structures, and interactions 
tend to obscure discriminatory intent (the “structural” cases)—the treatment of 
comparators as prerequisite to a claim may also exacerbate the difficulties that 
individuals already face in illuminating discrimination. The claim of structural 
analysis, as noted earlier, suggests that standard enforcement of discrimination 
laws misses many of the ways in which members of nondominant groups are 
excluded or marginalized not only by their supervisors but also by coworkers 
and others, with a detrimental effect on the terms and conditions of their 
employment.140 This analysis, which reflects both the changed workplace and 
our increasingly refined understanding of the dynamics producing inequality, 
requires adjudicators to recognize complexly constituted, nonexplicit bias in 
interactions that often take place over time.141 
The difficulty is that this view of the dynamics that produce inequality does 
not match the behavioral assumptions behind the comparator approach, which 
rely most heavily on striking differences in an employer’s treatment of 
comparable coworkers as the signal of discriminatory intent.142 A woman may 
be given less weighty assignments or excluded from certain meetings or 
outings that ultimately limit her opportunities to advance within a firm, yet 
unless a precisely comparable male colleague has not been excluded, the 
different treatment will not be legible for a court focused on actual 
comparators. Consider the law firm environment, for example. Because 
associates work on an array of cases, often with a variety of supervisors, a 
 
138.  Id.; see also id. at 265 (“Locked hair . . . is not so closely associated with black people that a 
racially neutral comment denigrating it can reasonably be understood as a reflection of 
discriminatory animus . . . . ”). 
139.  Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
140.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
141.  See Sturm, supra note 18, at 469 (explaining that the complexity of these claims “lies in the 
multiple conceptions and causes of the harm, the interactive and contextual character of the 
injury, the blurriness of the boundaries between legitimate and wrongful conduct, and the 
structural and interactive requirements of an effective remedy”). 
142.  See supra note 72. 
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female associate is unlikely to be able to identify a sufficient number of closely 
comparable colleagues with sufficiently similar credentials and assignments to 
make a persuasive case of sex-based disparate treatment based on differences in 
assignment quality.143 
Notably, some recent class actions have succeeded in persuading courts, at 
least for class certification purposes, that a particular type of hiring or 
promotion process (usually one in which supervisors have relatively unfettered 
discretion) is likely to facilitate discrimination based on a protected 
characteristic.144 Ordinarily, though, the constricted view of comparators that 
operates in most cases means that few plaintiffs are able to provide an adequate 
comparator class that has not been disadvantaged by the employer’s practices. 
In short, although comparison is the dominant method used for observing 
discrimination, an actual and sufficient comparator turns out to be 
unattainable for most individuals who claim discrimination. Further, because 
of the numerous situations in which a comparator does not exist by virtue of 
the theory underlying the claim, the insistence on comparators renders whole 
 
143.  Cf. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d
 
Cir. 1992) (rejecting a 
claim that a law firm’s assignment system had disadvantaged the plaintiff because of sex 
rather than because of her academic credentials); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why 
Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. 
REV. 493, 585 (1996) (arguing that “[n]either disparate treatment nor disparate impact 
analysis is well suited to rooting out the kind of adverse employment practices” related to 
assignments, training, and mentoring that are critical to advancement within law firms); S. 
Elizabeth Foster, Comment, The Glass Ceiling in the Legal Profession: Why Do Law Firms 
Have So Few Female Partners?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1631, 1642-43 (1995) (discussing the 
“exclusionary and discriminatory behavior” in law firms that results in women’s diminished 
opportunities for advancement). 
144.  See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (certifying a 
sex discrimination class action based in part on a determination that the employer’s 
promotion practices could have facilitated sex-based decisionmaking) cert. granted, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Nos. C-94-
4335 SI & C-95-2182 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (sustaining 
certification of a sex discrimination class action challenging hiring and promotion practices 
and quoting expert testimony explaining that “[i]n the context of a male-dominated culture, 
relying on highly arbitrary assessments of subjective hiring criteria allows stereotypes to 
influence hiring decisions”). But see, e.g., EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 
292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a race discrimination in hiring claim and holding that 
“[w]ithout probative evidence of discriminatory intent, however, Miniature is not liable 
when it passively relies on the natural flow of applicants for its entry-level positions”); 
EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6:01-CV-339, 2010 WL 583681, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 
2010) (excluding expert witness testimony regarding the link between an employer’s 
practices and sex discrimination on the grounds that the expert had not shown 
discriminatory intent when concluding that the “overwhelmingly male-dominated 
workforce” was likely to influence hiring decisions).  
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categories of potentially discriminatory conduct beyond the reach of 
discrimination law. 
i i i .  on the conceptual limitations of comparators 
As we have seen, courts place comparators on something of a doctrinal 
pedestal by treating them as the default heuristic and as a threshold 
requirement for illuminating whether discrimination could have occurred. Yet 
the vast number of cases in which comparisons simply cannot be made begs 
the question whether comparators deserve this status and whether we ought to 
accept, as many courts and individual judges have, that if no comparison can be 
drawn, discrimination could not have occurred. 
This Part argues that courts’ unequivocal embrace of comparators 
overstates comparators’ revelatory powers related to discrimination in two 
ways. First, the heuristic is overinclusive; it does not prove as much as it is 
often treated as proving, at least not without important additional assumptions 
from the factfinder. And second, the heuristic is underinclusive; a comparator’s 
absence does not necessarily show that discrimination has not occurred. To be 
clear, I am not suggesting that, as a result of these vulnerabilities, we abandon 
comparators entirely as a means of recognizing discrimination. Indeed, given 
the challenges associated with any means of observing discrimination, coupled 
with the entrenched judicial preferences for comparators and the heuristic’s 
occasional utility, that position would be both unwise and unrealistic. 
My point, instead, is that comparators, like other methodological devices, 
work by virtue of unstated assumptions about the nature of discrimination and 
about how best to identify it. When we take account of these assumptions, we 
will be better positioned to see that the comparatively different treatment 
revealed by the heuristic is a byproduct of discrimination rather than 
discrimination itself. With that awareness, we will also be better positioned to 
avoid erroneously insisting upon the presence of a differently treated 
comparator as a necessary (and, in some cases, sufficient) element of 
discrimination. 
A. Comparators as Overinclusive 
At the most basic level, comparators are surely useful in reducing the set of 
variables that might explain an employer’s adverse treatment of one employee 
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relative to another.145 Yet the move from the reduced set of explanations to the 
conclusion that an employer more likely than not acted because of the 
employee’s protected trait is not as defensible as courts sometimes suggest. 
Indeed, the confidence that many courts express in the power of 
comparison to reveal discrimination contrasts sharply with other significant 
strands of American discrimination jurisprudence that recognize the complex 
and idiosyncratic nature of most employment decisions. As the Court has 
observed, “[T]reating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in 
the employment context is par for the course.”146 Again: “To treat employees 
differently is . . . . simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically 
characterizes the employer-employee relationship.”147 Although the Court was 
writing in the context of a public employee’s equal protection argument that 
her layoff was impermissibly arbitrary, its understanding that employers 
“‘often must take into account the individual personalities and interpersonal 
relationships of employees in the workplace’”148 could hardly be limited to 
those circumstances. 
Yet if the baseline expectation is that employers will regularly treat 
similarly situated employees differently,149 different treatment of comparable 
coworkers is likely to reflect merely benign variation in the workplace.150 On 
this view, the comparator heuristic would be flawed if the fact of different 
treatment triggered our suspicion that discrimination had occurred. 
 
145.  If two employees have the same educational and experiential qualifications and similar job 
responsibilities, the set of possible explanations for the employer’s negative treatment of one 
of them is significantly reduced. As compared to a situation in which the employees have 
different qualifications and responsibilities, then, discrimination is proportionately more 
likely to be the reason for the employer’s adverse action. 
146.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 604 (2008). 
147.  Id. at 605; see also Ezold, 983 F.2d at 542 (observing that Title VII “does not require 
employers to treat all employees fairly”). 
148.  Engquist, 553 U.S. at 604 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 48, Engquist, 553 U.S. 591 (No. 91-
1780)). 
149.  This view that employers regularly act arbitrarily but without discriminatory intent 
reinforces, and is reinforced by, the strong commitment to at-will employment and the 
related reluctance of courts to “second-guess difficult and expertise-laden personnel 
judgments.” David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and 
Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level” Jobs, 33 HARV. 
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 57, 100 (1998). For further discussion of the comparator heuristic’s 
synergies with judicial deference to employers, see infra notes 215-217 and accompanying 
text. 
150.  But see Selmi, supra note 15, at 561-62 (arguing that courts underestimate the probability that 
discriminatory intent infects this sort of seemingly idiosyncratic treatment). 
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Even if employers ordinarily treat similarly situated employees in the same 
way, different treatment can signal discrimination only if we make several 
additional, arguably fragile assumptions. For one, reliance on comparators as 
expositors of discrimination assumes that employers act rationally, so that 
when they deviate from their typical equal treatment model, they do so 
deliberately in a way that reliably signals discrimination.151 If we assume, 
instead, that employers are not fully rational, we can find discrimination only 
by making the additional assumption that discriminatory intent, rather than 
arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, is more likely to explain deviations from equal 
treatment.152 
Of course, any exercise in comparison also requires the analyst to treat the 
inevitable differences between individuals as nonsalient. Because all individuals 
have multidimensional aspects of their identities, as current iterations of 
intersectionality theory show, very close comparators are hard to come by even 
for a relatively simple discrimination claim. In almost any setting, there are 
innumerable differences between individual employees, both by virtue of 
personal background and job assignments, that conceivably could explain an 
employer’s adverse action against one but not another. In “high-skill or 
knowledge intensive jobs,”153 this is true almost by definition, as no positions 
are exactly alike or often even very similar—at least in a workplace striving for 
an efficient, nonduplicative management structure. This not only makes 
monitoring difficult154 but also renders the comparator heuristic virtually 
unusable, as the essence of hiring and promotion in these positions depends on 
the unique set of skills and contacts that an experienced professional brings to a 
position. In this light, different treatment can nearly always be attributed to 
nondiscriminatory motivations. Yet the typical judicial reliance on the 
comparator heuristic does not ordinarily engage in depth, or at all, with those 
consequential determinations. 
Even in the context of lower-level positions, a comparison between two 
individuals who perform the same function but differ by the nature of their 
protected trait shows us intentional discrimination occurred only if we make 
assumptions that allow the comparison to do so. In this context, I think back to 
my days working at an ice cream shop. My manager, Chip, never liked me 
 
151.  Relatedly, if we were to treat job descriptions as reliable indicators of which jobs might be 
comparable across positions in a firm, we would assume a stability that runs contrary to the 
dynamic realities of actual jobs in any given workplace. 
152.  See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 (1993). 
153.  Charny & Gulati, supra note 149, at 60.  
154.  Id. at 60-61.  
  
discrimination by comparison 
775 
 
much and made clear from time to time that he wanted to fire me. Had he done 
so while leaving in place my male coworkers and replacing me with a young 
man, I could have demonstrated a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Or, if 
he fired only me after learning that every scooper, including me, gave away ice 
cream to friends, the comparison could also suggest sex discrimination—
disparate punishment of similarly situated employees for the same offense—if 
we let it. Given what we know about Chip’s sentiments toward me, however, 
comparison is not necessarily revealing of Chip’s reasons for the adverse action. 
Still, at the prima facie stage, this might not trouble us—the work that 
comparison does here, at most, is to make an opening suggestion that Chip 
fired me for an impermissible reason; it need not be treated as conclusive 
proof. 
But, as we move through the burden-shifting process, we ought to consider 
what additional work, if any, we allow the comparison to do. Or, put another 
way, the question is whether (and why) we treat the comparison as probative 
at all. Taking the case to the next stage, imagine that Chip offered a 
nondiscriminatory reason for firing me—he disliked my sense of humor or my 
commitment to my schoolwork. And suppose I offered evidence in response 
that he laughed heartily at my jokes and repeated them to others and had given 
me the same congratulatory ice cream cake for doing well at school that he had 
given to my male ice cream scooping peers. Then what? I have arguably shown 
not only that his reasons for the firing were not credible, but also that they 
were pretexts for discrimination. 
At this point, we might say that the set of possible reasons for Chip’s 
actions has been narrowed even further, to the point that we will treat sex 
discrimination as the likely reason for his firing me.155 But, again, comparison 
is the “closer” on my discrimination claim only if we are willing to impute 
discriminatory intent to Chip’s comparatively worse treatment of me relative to 
my male coworkers. The governing law says that we can; although the doctrine 
would not mandate a determination that Chip discriminated,156 my evidence 
would allow a factfinder to hold that Chip had discriminated against me. 
 
155.  Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“[O]nce the 
employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely 
alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the 
actual reason for its decision.”). 
156.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511 (holding that a court’s “rejection of the [employer]’s 
proffered reasons” for its actions does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law). 
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Yet if we could peer into Chip’s mind, we might have learned that his 
dislike was rooted in my particular ambitions for college (which were different 
from those of my also-college-bound scooping peers) rather than in my being 
female.157 Comparison, seen in this light, was helpful for showing that Chip 
saw me differently from how he saw my peers158 but was misleading to the 
extent that we read more into it than that. In other words, while the 
comparison can reliably narrow the set of reasons for Chip’s actions, we choose 
to infer that Chip acted “because of sex.” The comparator analysis itself does 
not require that interpretation of the facts. 
Two interrelated observations follow. The first is simply that, as suggested 
above, comparators are a valuable filtering device, in that we can be reasonably 
confident in their ability to shrink the set of possible explanations for an 
employer’s action. The second is that comparators are imperfect filtering 
devices; they are not a clear, or necessarily reliable, window into discriminatory 
intent. 
Although some might say that this imperfection of fit should lead us to 
abandon comparators altogether, that is not my suggestion. It is always the 
case that circumstantial evidence requires a factfinder to draw inferences about 
intent rather than guaranteeing certainty.159 And it is always the case that, 
unless we limit discrimination claims to situations where employers admit that 
they acted because of an employee’s protected characteristic, we must draw 
from circumstances. Consequently, to the extent that we recognize 
discrimination even when an employer denies having discriminated and 
require plaintiffs to prove an employer’s discriminatory intent, comparators are 
among our best resources.160  
The point, instead, is that comparators themselves neither provide 
definitive insight into employers’ motives nor inevitably compel conclusions 
regarding whether an employer acted because of an employee’s protected trait, 
as courts often suggest they do. Instead, the comparator’s revelation of 
 
157.  As the Court explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, “In saying that gender played a 
motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the 
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of 
those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.” 490 U.S. 228, 250 
(1989). 
158.  As a potential additional virtue, the comparator framework may encourage employers to be 
more explicit and comprehensive about the grounds for their actions and their agents’ 
actions to protect against adverse inferences. 
159.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
160.  Still, the imperfections of such an approach raise interesting questions about why the courts 
treat comparison as confidently as they do. I consider these questions below.  
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discriminatory intent rests on a set of assumptions about both the similarity of 
the complainant and the comparator and the baseline rationality of employers. 
For the comparator’s probative work to be assessed properly, relative to other 
methodologies, those assumptions must be part of the conversation. The 
comparator’s imperfections as a filtering device ought also to give us pause 
with respect to the transformation of comparators from heuristic to substantive 
law. 
B. Comparators as Underinclusive 
The comparator heuristic’s underinclusiveness should give us additional 
cause to be dubious when courts treat comparators as the only or preeminent 
method for illuminating discriminatory intent. Recall that the triggering 
problem for discrimination law is the employer’s decision to take action 
because of the trait. This means, again, that while the presence of a comparator 
may help illuminate an employer’s reliance on a protected trait, the existence of 
a better-off comparator is a byproduct of the discrimination rather than the 
discrimination itself. 
The Supreme Court made this point when considering the sex 
discrimination claims of female security guards who alleged that the county 
government running the jail where they worked intentionally paid them less 
because they were female.161 In its defense, the county argued that 
discrimination could have occurred only if the women had engaged in “equal 
work” relative to the male guards.162 The Court was clear that the county’s 
comparative conceptualization of discrimination was unduly constrained. “In 
practical terms,” the Court wrote, restricting recognition to instances where 
comparisons could be made would “mean[] that a woman who is 
discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no relief—no matter how egregious 
the discrimination might be—unless her employer also employed a man in an 
equal job in the same establishment, at a higher rate of pay.”163 The Court 
labeled this type of practice as “blatantly discriminatory,” recognizing that the 
discrimination was rooted not in the comparison between men and women but 
in the employer’s decision to underpay an employee because she is a woman.164 
 
161.  Cnty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
162.  Id. at 177. 
163.  Id. at 178. 
164.  Id. at 179.  
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Likewise, the Second Circuit observed: 
If [an] employee were fired for a discriminatory reason, and no one was 
hired to replace him, he could never demonstrate disparate treatment 
because there is no point of comparison. . . . [I]t stands to reason that, 
in such a case, the plaintiff should be able to create an inference of 
discrimination . . . .165  
Or imagine, returning to my ice cream scooping experience, that Chip fired 
me because of my sex but did not replace me with another scooper. The 
absence of a comparator would not change the fact that Chip treated me 
adversely “because of sex.” 
In other words, if we understand discrimination to mean adverse treatment 
because of a protected trait, we ought to be able to find discrimination even 
when comparison is not a meaningful possibility. It is no doubt true that, 
without a comparator, the fact that an employer acted because of the 
employee’s trait rather than for some other reason becomes more difficult to 
see. But, to the extent we agree that the discrimination could have occurred, 
our limitations in seeing discriminatory intent should prompt us to explore 
other methodologies and perhaps rethink the way in which courts rely on 
comparators as our best, or even exclusive, methodology. 
C. Comparison and Disparate Impact 
Interestingly, disparate impact theory and jurisprudence reinforce how 
questionable the conceptual link is between comparators and proof of 
discriminatory intent. Comparison is critical to disparate impact cases in that 
the trait-based impact is ordinarily shown by comparing the effect of a rule or 
policy on individuals with and without the protected trait at issue. So, for 
example, in the Court’s recent ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano, the disparate impact 
claim rested in part on a showing that the city’s decision not to rely on test 
results had a comparatively adverse effect on white firefighters who would have 
been promoted had the test results been counted.166 
 
165.  Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001). 
166.  129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). For other cases in which comparators are critical to demonstrating 
disparate impact, see, for example, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010), which 
found that the plaintiff had made out a cognizable prima facie disparate impact claim by 
showing that an employment practice affected African-Americans more negatively than 
others; and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,  554 U.S. 84 (2008), which held that 
a disparate impact claim requires plaintiffs to show that employment practices cause 
statistical disparities between groups. 
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Yet the point of comparative proof in Ricci and other disparate impact cases 
is not to show the employer’s discriminatory intent but rather to highlight the 
effect of the challenged decision. Indeed, courts do not draw an inference of 
discriminatory intent from the comparatively adverse treatment. Instead, intent 
in disparate impact cases is irrelevant to the analysis and, more deeply, to the 
law’s concern in this area, which is to eradicate employer actions that have the 
effect, if not the aim, of discriminating based on a protected trait.167 Thus, 
while the primary focus here is on the overreliance on comparators in disparate 
treatment cases, the additional evidence of a disconnect between comparators 
and intent in the disparate impact context should cast further doubt on the 
faith that courts place in comparators’ revelatory powers. 
iv.  context: a methodological alternative 
Notwithstanding the dominance of comparators in much of the 
employment discrimination jurisprudence, harassment and stereotyping case 
law shows that the task of observing discrimination can be managed 
successfully with other techniques and that discrimination is not centrally 
defined by comparison. Indeed, although these cases are not often treated as 
different in kind analytically from other discrimination cases, when seen 
through a comparator lens it becomes clear that they are. While individual 
employees might offer a comparator as part of their proof, the discrimination 
claim is typically founded not on a comparison to coworkers but instead on the 
harassing and/or stereotype-based interactions between the employee and 
others in the workplace. 
More specifically, in the harassment context, the employee will point to one 
or more statements or acts by coworkers or supervisors that negatively affected 
the employee’s work environment and had either an explicit or implicit 
connection to the employee’s protected characteristic(s). A sexual harassment 
plaintiff might indicate, for example, that a supervisor or coworker touched her 
inappropriately or targeted her with sexually demeaning comments. 
In the stereotyping cases, an individual will seek to show that an employer 
treated him or her adversely because of stereotypes associated with the 
individual’s protected characteristic(s). Here, the crux of the claim is typically 
that the employer acted adversely based on doubts about the individual’s 
 
167.  See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003) (noting that while disparate 
treatment cases depend on an employer’s motivation for the challenged acts, disparate 
impact cases do not). 
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ability to perform the job at issue not because of merit but because of 
stereotypes associated with the individual’s identity characteristic. 
For both types of cases,168 courts discern discriminatory intent in the acts 
and statements at issue by looking to all of the surrounding circumstances for 
the ways in which the protected traits may have operated to affect employer 
decisionmaking. Comparators may be present, but they are not decisive. For 
this reason, these cases, and their application of a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis, reinforce the claim here that comparators are best understood as one 
among several observational tools rather than as a defining element without 
which discrimination cannot occur. This Part first will trace the development 
of the contextual methodology in discrimination cases involving stereotyping 
and harassment, and then will consider the relationship of this method to the 
work of comparators as a means for seeing discrimination. 
A. The Emergence of the Contextual Model in Stereotyping and Harassment 
Jurisprudence 
The recognition that discriminatory intent could be discerned from 
context, including an employer’s acts and statements, rather than from 
comparison to other employees, initially took hold in the Supreme Court’s 
sexual harassment jurisprudence. Indeed, in the Court’s first case to find that 
harassing acts could themselves amount to discrimination, Meritor Savings 
 
168.  It bears noting that harassment and stereotyping claims are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
there are a number of cases in which employees have prevailed because the harassment they 
experienced took the form of stereotyping linked to a protected characteristic. In Nichols v. 
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001), for example, a male waiter 
was repeatedly harassed because his coworkers thought he was too effeminate. As the court 
observed, 
At its essence, the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that 
Sanchez did not act as a man should act. Sanchez was attacked for walking and 
carrying his tray “like a woman”—i.e., for having feminine mannerisms. Sanchez 
was derided for not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his friend. 
Sanchez’s male coworkers and one of his supervisors repeatedly reminded 
Sanchez that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, referring to 
him as “she” and “her.” And, the most vulgar name-calling directed at Sanchez 
was cast in female terms. We conclude that this verbal abuse was closely linked to 
gender. 
Id. at 874; see also Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (finding it “clear” that sexualized attacks on a gay man, “who was singled out from his 
male coworkers” for hostile treatment, stated a sex discrimination claim). 
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Bank v. Vinson, comparators were but one option on a long list of techniques 
for discerning discriminatory intent.169 
In Meritor, the Court addressed whether a bank supervisor, who had acted 
in sexually aggressive ways toward the plaintiff, had acted “because of sex” 
rather than for some other reason by looking to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s guidelines. Those guidelines identified 
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature” as sexual harassment and, separately, 
defined sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.170 Yet the Court also 
made clear that not all such advances and conduct would amount to 
discrimination; instead, only “sufficiently severe and pervasive” acts would 
warrant remediation under the statute.171 
But neither of these points, by itself, shows that the sexualized conduct was 
“because of sex” rather than for some other reason. Indeed, the Court has since 
reiterated that sexualized harassment is not necessarily harassment “because of 
sex” within the meaning of Title VII.172 As Justice Scalia observed for a 
 
169.  The central question was whether a sexually harassed litigant needed to show additional 
adverse action by the employer, such as demotion or termination, to state a discrimination 
claim. The Court held she did not. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) 
(“Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the 
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”). Both in Meritor 
and subsequently, the Court recognized that racially harassing acts can likewise create a 
hostile and discriminatory environment. See id. at 66-67; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002) (“Hostile work environment claims based on racial 
harassment are reviewed under the same standard as those based on sexual harassment.”). 
170.  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
171.  See id. at 67 (“[The] ‘mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive 
feelings in an employee’ would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] sufficiently 
significant degree to violate Title VII.” (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 
1972))). “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 
‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 
904 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) 
(“[I]t is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does 
not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’” (quoting Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998))); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (stating that judicial standards for sexual harassment must “filter 
out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic 
use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’” (quoting BARBARA 
LINDEMANN & DAVID KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992))). 
172.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); see also David S. 
Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1748-58 (2002) (observing that modern academics and courts have 
questioned the assumption that sexual harassment occurs “because of sex”). 
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unanimous court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, “We have never held 
that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is 
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used 
have sexual content or connotations.”173 Still, even while characterizing “the 
critical issue” in a comparative manner—that “members of one sex [be] 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed”—comparators were last on the 
Court’s list of methods of seeing the link between the adverse act and the 
protected characteristic.174 The more prominent and “easy” methods, according 
to the Court, involved consideration of the harassing statements and actions 
themselves,175 as well as the defendant’s sexual orientation.176 
The larger point, as the Court explained, is that observing discrimination in 
a workplace requires consideration of not only “the words used or the physical 
acts performed” but also “a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships.”177 In short, what matters for seeing 
 
173.  Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
174.  Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); 
see also id. at 80-81 (“A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct 
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a 
mixed-sex workplace.”). 
175.  Id. at 80 (“A trier of fact might reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female 
victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as to make it 
clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the 
workplace.”). 
176.  On the relevance of a defendant’s sexual orientation, the Court stated: 
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most 
male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct 
typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable 
to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. 
The same chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex 
harassment, if there were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But 
harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference 
of discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Id. 
177.  Id. at 82. See also, e.g., Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 221 (2d
 
Cir. 2004) (“The mere fact 
that men and women are both exposed to the same offensive circumstances on the job 
site . . . does not mean that, as a matter of law, their work conditions are necessarily equally 
harsh. The objective hostility of a work environment depends on the totality of the 
circumstances.”); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 
2003) (rejecting a discrimination claim after “consider[ing], as in any sex harassment case, 
the ‘social context in which the particular behavior occurs’” (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 
81)). 
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discrimination is context, with comparison being but one technique among 
several for making that contextual evaluation.178 
The use of this type of contextual but noncomparative evaluation to 
observe identity-based discrimination can also be seen outside the employment 
context. In finding that Georgia’s segregated confinement of mentally disabled 
patients amounted to discrimination “by reason of” disability,179 for example, 
the Court in Olmstead v. Zimring rejected outright the need for a comparator. It 
declared instead that it could observe discrimination by analyzing the 
segregating act in context, similar to its approach in the harassment cases. 
Specifically, the Court rested its “[r]ecognition that unjustified institutional 
isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination” on two 
observations—one related to the expressive meaning of isolation and the other 
related to the harm caused to those isolated: 
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit 
from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that 
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in 
community life. Second, confinement in an institution severely 
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family 
relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, 
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.180 
In short, the Court saw that the segregation of mentally disabled 
individuals was discrimination because of disability not by comparing the act 
to the treatment of others, but instead by looking more broadly at the 
segregating act’s social meaning and its injurious effect.181 
 
178.  This could be characterized as a Bayesian approach to evidence. One might also argue that 
the Court in Meritor deployed a hypothetical comparator by imagining, in effect, a man who 
would not have been subject to the same conduct as the female plaintiff. If that is the case, 
there is no mention of that analytic move by the Court. Further, the “opposite-sex” 
hypothetical comparator provides little help in understanding the Court’s analysis in the 
same-sex harassment context, where the Court, as in Oncale, did not give any indication that 
it was imagining that a female worker on the offshore oil platform where Joseph Oncale was 
harassed would not also have been subject to harassment. 
179.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 598 (1999). 
180.  Id. at 600-01 (internal citations omitted); see also City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (“In forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.” (quoting Sprogis v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))). 
181.  Notably, although Congress had specified this type of segregation as discriminatory, the 
Court did not simply rest on the statute’s findings, which “identified unjustified 
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The importance of contextual evidence of discrimination, rather than 
comparator evidence, can be seen in stereotyping cases as well. In Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, for example, the Court found that the accounting firm 
had discriminated impermissibly by relying on sex stereotypes to deny 
partnership to Ann Hopkins.182 Although Hopkins had offered evidence of how 
male partnership candidates had been treated, the Court noted specifically the 
district court’s finding that she did not have an adequate comparator. There 
were male candidates who lacked the interpersonal skills that Hopkins had also 
been accused of lacking, but they were not sufficiently comparable because they 
“possessed other, positive traits that Hopkins lacked.”183 Instead, the Court 
looked to the sex-stereotyped remarks made about Hopkins to find that the 
firm had acted “because of” sex. These included the observation by some 
partners at the firm that she was “macho,” that she “overcompensated for 
being a woman,” that she should “take a course at charm school,” and that, “to 
improve her chances for partnership . . . [she] should ‘walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.’”184 
In an approach endorsed by others on the Court,185 the plurality treated its 
observation of stereotyping remarks as equivalent to observing discriminatory 
intent directly, writing simply that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be 
evidence that gender played a part” in an employer’s decision.186 Although 
 
‘segregation’ of persons with disabilities as a ‘for[m] of discrimination,’” but, as illustrated, 
explained and justified that determination. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 12101(a)(2), (5) (2006)). 
182.  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
183.  Id. at 236. 
184.  Id. at 235. 
185.  Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring) (“I agree that the finding [of sex discrimination] was 
supported by the record.”); id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the 
plurality that “on the facts presented in this case,” Hopkins had showed that the firm relied 
adversely on her sex in its partnership decision); id. at 265 (“Congress was certainly not 
blind to the stigmatic harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one 
as an inferior by reason of one’s race or sex.”). Even the dissenters agreed that “Hopkins 
plainly presented a strong case . . . of the presence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse’s 
partnership process” and that “[e]vidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of 
course, quite relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.” Id. at 294, 295 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
186.  Id. at 251; see also id. (“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group.”). Further, the Court explained why stereotypes 
violate Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition: “An employer who objects to 
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an 
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Hopkins had introduced expert testimony to show, through social 
psychological theory, that these and other comments should properly be seen 
as sex stereotyping, the plurality characterized that testimony as “merely icing 
on Hopkins’ cake.”187 Making its observation of discrimination sound 
straightforward, the plurality observed that “[i]t takes no special training to 
discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as 
requiring ‘a course at charm school.’”188 
The Court was clear that stereotyped remarks themselves do not necessarily 
show that impermissible discrimination has occurred. Instead, the employee 
who has alleged discrimination “must show that the employer actually relied 
on her gender in making its decision.”189 But, most significant for our 
purposes, the remarks can help make that showing because they are treated as 
exposing the employer’s intent to act because of the employee’s protected 
characteristic.190 
B. Acts, Statements, and Automaticity 
In essence, the Court, through its “no special training” comments, 
suggested that drawing the link between acts, statements, and discriminatory 
intent is undemanding, if not automatic. Yet much like the overstated faith in 
the comparator heuristic, this characterization also implies that acts and 
statements themselves do more work than they actually do to establish that an 
employer has acted because of a protected trait. 
Justice O’Connor’s commentary in Price Waterhouse is illustrative of the 
way in which courts frequently gloss over the difficulties associated with 
discerning discriminatory intent from stereotyping statements. As she 
explained, not every statement regarding an employee’s sex necessarily 
 
intolerable and impermissible catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a 
job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.” Id. 
187.  Id. at 256. 
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. at 251. 
190.  See also Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2009) (putting comments 
made to the plaintiff-employee in context and finding those comments sufficient to state a 
sex stereotyping claim); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 3d 293, 303-05 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(finding, in context, that an employer’s comments about the plaintiff themselves amounted 
to sex stereotyping). 
Some would argue that courts are comfortable turning to context where stereotyping or 
harassing incidents have occurred because those incidents are more easily understood than 
other occurrences, as described in the cases in Part II, supra, to signal the presence of 
discriminatory intent. I address this point infra at text accompanying notes 264-265. 
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demonstrates sex stereotyping and, therefore, discriminatory intent. “[A] mere 
reference to ‘a lady candidate’ might show that gender ‘played a role’ in the 
decision,” she wrote, “but by no means could support a rational factfinder’s 
inference that the decision was made ‘because of’ sex.”191 For Justice O’Connor, 
this understanding followed from the point that “[r]ace and gender always 
‘play a role’ in an employment decision in the benign sense that these are 
human characteristics of which decisionmakers are aware and about which they 
may comment in a perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory fashion.”192 
Yet distinguishing the comments that reveal discriminatory intent from 
those that do not is neither as easy nor as obvious as the comments of Justice 
O’Connor and other members of the Court seem to suggest.193 While Justice 
O’Connor did not find the “lady candidate” reference troublesome, others, 
including Hopkins’s expert witness, could make a strong case that the reference 
showed that the firm’s treatment of Hopkins was centrally shaped by her being 
a woman to the point that the very way in which they identified Hopkins 
focused on her being female. Likewise, although the majority in Olmstead 
deemed it “evident” that the act of segregating mentally disabled individuals 
amounted to discrimination,194 the dissent found it equally evident that no 
discrimination had occurred.195 
Indeed, a central claim of second-generation theories is that discriminatory 
intent is often missed in precisely the sort of “lady candidate” statement that 
Justice O’Connor dismissed as nonprobative. As discussed earlier, for example, 
many courts would not see race discrimination in the refusal to promote the 
“fifth black woman” even if the nonpromoted woman could identify negative 
comments about her African-style clothing or her black church choir 
 
191.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277. 
192.  Id. 
193.  Indeed, as suggested earlier, it is this difficulty that, outside of the stereotyping and 
harassment cases, drives courts to embrace comparator evidence so strongly. 
194.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999). 
195.  Id. at 623 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s analysis as “fly[ing] in the 
face” of the Court’s precedent). We can see similar disagreement over the link between sex-
based rules and stereotyping in Nguyen v. INS, where Justice O’Connor, in dissent, had no 
difficulty concluding that a rule favoring mothers over fathers for purposes of conferring 
U.S. citizenship on foreign-born children was rooted in impermissible sex stereotypes, while 
a majority of the Court found the sex-based distinction to be perfectly legitimate. Compare 
533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), with 533 U.S. at 56-73 (majority 
opinion). For further discussion of the ways in which the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Nguyen interpreted the same facts differently and, consequently, reached different 
conclusions about the constitutionality of the challenged rule, see Goldberg, Constitutional 
Tipping Points, supra note 30, at 1970-74. 
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membership, so long as her four African-American peers were promoted.196 
Yet as Carbado and Gulati suggest, when examined closely, those sorts of 
comments reflect the same sort of racial stereotyping that is seen more easily in 
other settings.197 
In other words, a case like Price Waterhouse may be easy because the Court 
“gets” the link between sexism and statements about a partnership candidate 
being too macho. Likewise, the Court may have little difficulty finding that an 
employer’s use of the word “boy” when talking to African-American employees 
suggests the presence of discriminatory intent.198 But there is nothing inherent 
in harassing acts and stereotyping statements in general that makes their 
underlying discriminatory intent fundamentally easier to unmask than the 
discriminatory intent that might underlie other types of adverse treatment. 
Instead, it is agreement (or presumed agreement) on the social meaning of 
those acts and statements, when considered through a contextual lens, that 
renders the cases easy for courts to decide. Consequently the “easy” 
characterization should be understood as describing the Court’s comfort level 
with finding discriminatory intent in particular acts or statements, and not as 
suggesting that observing discriminatory intent is any more automatic in the 
stereotyping and harassment contexts than it is through comparisons. 
C. Reconsidering Comparators in Light of the Contextually Focused Stereotyping 
and Harassment Jurisprudence 
Recall Justice Thomas’s assertion that a conceptualization of discrimination 
that does not require a comparison is “nonsensical”199 and “drains the term of 
 
196.  Cf. Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(presenting differing views in majority and dissenting opinions as to whether a policy 
requiring female employees to wear makeup constituted sex stereotyping); Zalewska v. 
Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to give credence to the 
“stereotype[]” that a woman wearing pants is dressed “more masculinely”); Weinstock v. 
Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 44-45 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that labels such as “nice” and 
“nurturing” used to describe a female professor were insufficient as a matter of law to 
demonstrate sexually discriminatory intent). 
197.  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 21, at 1279-93. Again, even readers who reject either the 
premise of identity performance theory or the view that discrimination law embodies the 
theory’s premise may benefit from seeing that the easy identification of discrimination in 
some acts and statements but not others is not because those acts and statements are 
different in kind but rather because there is more general consensus about discriminatory 
intent underlying some acts and statements than there is about others.  
198.  See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). 
199.  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 618 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
  
the yale law journal  120: 728   2 011  
788 
 
any meaning other than as a proxy for decisions disapproved of by this 
Court.”200 Specifically, Justice Thomas suggested that “no principle” could 
“limit[] this new species of ‘discrimination’ claim . . . because it looks merely to 
an individual in isolation, without comparing him to otherwise similarly 
situated persons, and determines that discrimination occurs merely because 
that individual does not receive the treatment he wishes to receive.”201 
If it is correct that discrimination exists only where an individual can show 
a comparator in a better-off position, then we ought to be able to locate this 
type of comparison within the harassment and stereotyping jurisprudence. If 
not, we ought to ask whether Justice Thomas’s concerns about the potential 
lack of a limiting principle for a noncomparative discrimination analysis 
undermine the validity of the contextual method for observing discrimination. 
As a preliminary matter, it is worth reiterating that Justice Thomas’s 
constrained conceptualization of discrimination did not capture majority 
support when he advanced it in Olmstead and that his approach conflicts with 
the Court’s harassment and stereotyping decisions discussed above. Moreover, 
comparison is arguably counterproductive as a means for illuminating, let 
alone defining, discrimination where an employer singles out an employee for 
harassment or stereotyping because of a protected trait. In these kinds of cases, 
an employee can often show that others outside his or her protected group 
were not treated adversely, but the employer can likewise show that some 
within the protected group were not treated adversely either. At that point, the 
comparison no more allows for an inference of discriminatory intent based on a 
protected characteristic than for an inference that something else particular to 
the employee had provoked the employer’s actions. 
Yet, as discussed above, it is long settled that when an employer targets one 
employee for adverse treatment from among others who share the same 
protected trait, discrimination can be found. Despite Justice Scalia’s having 
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion in Olmstead, it was Scalia’s own opinion in 
Oncale that made this point by allowing a man to bring a sexual harassment 
claim based on the activities of other men in a workplace where no women 
were present.202 Even Justice Kennedy, who agreed with Justice Thomas’s 
 
200.  Id. at 624. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77, 79-80 (1998). On the question 
whether ideas of comparison are embedded in conceptualizations of sexual harassment, 
Katherine Franke has observed that “sexual harassment is a kind of sex discrimination not 
because the conduct would not have been undertaken if the victim had been a different 
sex . . . but precisely because . . . . it perpetuates, enforces, and polices a set of gender norms 
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insistence on comparators, did not fully embrace the limited scope for 
discrimination law that Justice Thomas advanced. Instead, he specifically 
“put[] aside issues of animus or unfair stereotype” when expressing his 
support for a comparison-based methodology, suggesting, in effect, that the 
presence of either could render the comparison-driven analysis unnecessary.203 
All of this reinforces that while comparators are one acceptable mode of 
exposing discrimination, they are certainly not, conceptually or doctrinally, a 
categorical requirement. Yet the question remains whether courts, by finding 
discrimination absent a comparative showing, are misusing discrimination law 
to mandate their own preferred code of conduct per Justice Thomas’s view. 
The very suggestion that comparator-based discrimination findings are 
objective while noncomparative analyses are subjective significantly overstates 
the differences between these methods for discerning discrimination, creating a 
false and unhelpfully dichotomous analysis. As discussed earlier, observing 
discrimination through comparators is no more automatic than through these 
other means. The determination that a comparator is adequate (or inadequate) 
for purposes of illuminating discriminatory intent arguably effectuates the 
subjective preferences of courts at least as much as the finding of 
discrimination through an examination of acts or statements. So while it is true 
that making a contextual determination about which acts or statements reveal 
impermissible discrimination requires judgment calls or assumptions by the 
court, so too does the application of the comparator analysis. 
Indeed, the suggestion that discrimination can truly be seen only via 
comparators and that all other non-comparison-based discrimination findings 
amount to policy judgments is reminiscent of a decades-old debate about the 
underpinnings of equality guarantees. Prompting that debate was the 
argument, advanced by Peter Westen, that equality was both “empty” and 
“entirely ‘[c]ircular’” because similar treatment could be required only for 
those deemed to be sufficiently similar.204 Others quickly responded with a 
 
that seek to feminize women and masculinize men.” Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong 
with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 696 (1997). 
203.  Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 611 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed that “[a]t the 
outset it should be noted there is no allegation that Georgia officials acted on the basis of 
animus or unfair stereotypes regarding the disabled,” id., and argued that “absent a showing 
of policies motivated by improper animus or stereotypes, it would be necessary to show that 
a comparable or similarly situated group received different treatment,” id. at 613. 
204.  Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547-51 (1982). Westen argues 
that: 
Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own. 
Without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a formula that can have 
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range of theories to suggest that the equality guarantee did indeed have 
valuable content.205 Yet, however forcefully advocated, each of these positions 
necessarily rested on the premise that substantive judgments and assumptions 
were required to give equality its content.206 
Likewise, the process of observing discrimination necessarily requires 
judgments about whatever circumstantial forms of evidence we are 
considering—whether comparisons, harassing acts, or stereotyping 
statements—as well as decisions about which discrimination theories to 
embrace. As shown earlier, choices about which comparisons will be treated as 
exposing discrimination and which will not, just like the choices about which 
acts and statements are because of a protected trait and which are not, are just 
that—choices. None is more mechanical or automatic than the other. 
Because these choices are thus essential to evaluating any circumstantial 
evidence, comparators provide false certainty to the extent that they are treated 
as elemental to, or objectively confirmatory of, discrimination. In turn, this 
false certainty enables courts to elide accountability (1) for their decisions to 
require comparators in the first place; and (2) for their dispositive judgments 
regarding the scope of acceptable comparators and the diminished value of 
other non-comparator-based evidence. The contextual evaluation, by contrast, 
gives greater exposure to the choices that courts make regarding their theory of 
discrimination and the relationship of workplace evidence to that theory. This 
is because the doctrine insists that a connection be established between the 
 
nothing to say about how we should act. With such standards, equality becomes 
superfluous, a formula that can do nothing but repeat what we already know. 
Id. at 547 (footnote omitted). 
205.  See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of 
Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1983) (urging that an “equality-of-respect” model 
reflects the best substantive understanding of the equal protection guarantee); Kent 
Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1184-85 (1983) 
(arguing that the principle of equality has been central to advancement of greater political 
rights and social opportunities); Karst, supra note 33, at 279-80 (maintaining that equality 
rhetoric has substantive effect on legal rights and political culture); Kenneth W. Simons, 
Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1985) (“A right to equal treatment 
is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because another person or class 
receives it.”). 
206.  See Finley, supra note 33, at 1144. Discussing Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1711 (1976), Finley writes, “Kennedy’s insight is 
that there is no determinate, coherent way to choose between . . . formal equality or 
substantive equality. Inevitably, the choice depends on our sets of values and visions of 
society.” Finley, supra note 33, at 1144 n.113. Finley adds that “[t]here is no way, within the 
doctrinal framework itself, to tell us when we should adopt the approach of formal equality, 
and when a substantive equality approach is called for. Instead, we must appeal to deeply 
political conceptions of what values and type of society we wish to foster.” Id. 
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protected characteristic and the acts or statements at issue.207 Of course, as 
illustrated by Price Waterhouse, where courts find that connection to be easy or 
obvious, they may move quickly or automatically from the acts or statements to 
a finding of discrimination.208 But even in those circumstances, the move is 
there for all to see, whereas the comparator framework provides cover for 
courts’ similar judgments and the resulting jurisprudential inhibition of all but 
the most formalistic antidiscrimination norms and theories.  
v. judicial  legitimacy and the sticking power of 
comparators 
At this point we have seen that comparators are not the only means for 
seeing discrimination and that, by design (or at least in a typical application), 
there are serious limitations to the discrimination that comparators can reach. 
Yet comparators remain dominant to the point that discrimination lawsuits 
typically cannot be won without them.  
This Part explores the reasons for comparators’ sticking power, and aims 
both to explain why such an imperfect means for observing and defining 
discrimination has achieved dominance and to understand the possibilities for 
new methodologies going forward. My central claim is that comparators have 
gained their status because their empirical appearance enables courts to 
accommodate a primary legitimacy concern that plagues judicial intervention 
on issues related to identity and a subsidiary concern related to employer 
autonomy. That is, comparators offer a seemingly bright-line framework for 
identifying elusive facts and resolving complex social judgments even though a 
flexible framework would be more appropriate. 
A. The Legitimacy Concerns at Play 
The prospect of a free-form, or even relatively unstructured, inquiry into 
workplace behaviors related to individual identity taps directly into the 
legitimacy- and capacity-protecting inclination exhibited by many courts to 
avoid tasks that have the cast of a sociological inquiry.209 This antisociological 
 
207.  In addition to its value in terms of judicial accountability, the contextual evaluation also 
adds substantive value by exposing, and possibly avoiding, the diminishment of 
antidiscrimination norms effected by the comparator heuristic. See supra note 33. 
208.  See supra text accompanying notes 182-188. 
209.  For extended development of this point, see Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, supra 
note 30; and Goldberg, Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments, supra note 30. 
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bent can be seen, for example, in the Court’s turn to visible markers such as 
ancestral lineage and surnames210 when defining identity categories, rather 
than to the more complex and contested social norms that are widely 
understood, even by the Court, to contribute importantly to the content of 
these categories.211 It can be seen as well in the way that the Court cites 
changed factual understandings about a social group rather than 
acknowledging changed social norms when invalidating restrictions on group-
member rights previously accepted as legitimate.212 
The basic idea is that while courts may be well equipped to sift among 
empirical facts, they are less institutionally suited, both in terms of training and 
resources, for deep investigation and analysis of social norms. Consequently, 
however attentive they may be to trends in social stances regarding an issue or 
 
We might point to similar reasons to explain courts’ turn to discrimination as the legal 
framework for evaluating sexual harassment, rather than dignity, which is the more 
common approach within European law. As Gabrielle Friedman and James Whitman have 
observed, “For Americans . . . the concept of ‘dignity’ often remains unconquerably vague, 
unfillable with meaningful content. . . . It is ‘discrimination’ that seems the hard concept in 
America, the concept with real content.” Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The 
European Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 241, 268 (2003). 
210.  See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 (1987) (relying on an early 
nineteenth-century definition of race “continued series of descendants from a parent who is 
called the stock”) (internal citation omitted); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 n.12 
(1954) (“[J]ust as persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish 
[sur]names provide ready identification of the members of this class.”). These same themes 
can be traced through lower court decisions. See, e.g., Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 
540 (Cal. 1971) (identifying race and lineage as “immutable trait[s], a status into which the 
class members are locked by the accident of birth”); Hernandez v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (characterizing lineage and race as “classifications 
based upon unalterable traits”). But see Commonwealth v. Rico, 711 A.2d 990, 994 (Pa. 
1998) (“The mere spelling of a person’s surname is insufficient to show that he or she 
belongs to a particular ethnic group.”). 
Kenji Yoshino has written in the equal protection context about the way in which a 
trait’s “visibility” enhances the likelihood for heightened judicial review of trait-based 
classifications. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility 
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 496-98 (1998). He 
described this visibility as “the perceptibility of traits such as skin color that manifest 
themselves on the physical body in a relatively permanent and recognizable way.” Id. at 497.  
211.  See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 610-11 (cataloguing dictionaries and encyclopedias 
that discuss the socially constructed nature of race); Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 587 
(7th Cir. 2008) (describing “‘race’” as “a fuzzy term”). 
212.  See Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, supra note 30, at 1998-99 (citing Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 610 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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a particular social group,213 courts are more likely to register that awareness 
through commentary about observable facts than through a sociologically 
framed analysis. While the latter might be more accurate and candid, it also 
would leave courts more vulnerable to charges that they are acting beyond their 
capacity and using their powers to institutionalize their own social views into 
legal mandates.214 
In addition, courts tend to be especially wary of appearing to be hyper-
regulators of the workplace given the background commitments, both 
ideological and doctrinal, that typically favor employer autonomy. Because 
discrimination law carves out an exception to the general tolerance for bad 
workplace behavior,215 including “low-grade” discrimination,216 courts have a 
strong interest in avoiding the appearance that they are deploying the law in 
ways that infringe on employers’ well-established prerogatives to govern their 
workplaces as they like.217 
 
213.  Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 272 (1993) (“Mr. 
Dooley’s dictum about the Supreme Court’s tendency to follow the election returns seems 
no less apt today than when it was first printed almost a century ago.”); Barry Friedman, 
Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2606 (2003) (“[J]udicial 
decisions rest within a range of acceptability to a majority of the people.”). 
214.  Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, supra note 30, at 1999; cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1241 (2004) (identifying a similar concern as a reason for the Court’s avoidance of 
explicit morals-based rationales for government action). 
215.  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (addressing the “risk” 
that Title VII might function as “a general civility code for the American workplace”); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (explaining that Title VII “eliminates 
certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ 
freedom of choice” and describing the Court’s task as drawing a “balance between employee 
rights and employer prerogatives”). 
216.  By “low-grade” discrimination, I mean the discriminatory acts that the law has been 
construed not to prohibit. In the sexual harassment context, for example, the Court has 
reinforced that Title VII “forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 
‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. See also id. (“‘Conduct that 
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is 
beyond Title VII’s purview.’” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))). 
217.  For a discussion of the historical development of the at-will employment doctrine in 
America, which arguably has influenced contemporary views about judicial deference to 
employer autonomy, see Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The 
Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 66 (2000) (identifying at-will 
employment as a “fundamental assumption [that] has shaped our labor law”). Cf. Deborah 
A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653 
(2000) (arguing that the expansion of modern tort law is gradually eviscerating at-will 
employment in America); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will 
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B. The Comparator Heuristic’s Legitimizing Work 
The comparator heuristic, as it is used by most courts, accommodates both 
of these concerns because it gives the appearance that the facts of differential 
treatment, rather than the courts’ own assumptions and judgments, are doing 
the work to show that trait-based discrimination has occurred and that, as 
required by the applicable discrimination law, the court must intervene. That 
is, if the comparison reveals that an employee with X characteristic was treated 
differently from the similarly situated employee without X characteristic, the 
resulting inference of discriminatory intent is treated as the comparison’s 
logical, natural product.218 
The comparison thus has an empirical cast to it—it documents, from facts, 
the different treatment and, by implication, the discriminatory intent. Given 
the pressures created by courts’ general orientation to avoid the sociological 
role and the undue disruption of employer prerogatives, the comparator 
heuristic provides comfort by appearing to produce “hard” evidence of 
discrimination. Put another way, the inference of discriminatory intent 
becomes less superficially vulnerable, at least from the vantage point of the 
judicial-legitimacy concerns just described, to the extent that it is presented as 
resting on facts rather than on the court’s subjective judgments about a 
workplace. Yet, as discussed above, comparators produce results regarding the 
presence of discriminatory intent that are surely false. Further, by failing to 
specify the results’ underlying subjectivity, they obscure the absence of judicial 
accountability for the analytic choices and assumptions made. 
The contextual methodology for gleaning discriminatory intent from 
stereotyping and harassing acts might seem to be in tension with these 
legitimacy concerns because it lacks the comparators’ ability to produce “facts.” 
As applied, however, courts find other ways to suggest that it is the workplace 
context, rather than their own judgment, that is shedding light on the presence 
or absence of discrimination. Recall that in the stereotyping and harassment 
contexts, courts have stressed that linking workplace conduct to a protected 
 
World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996) (“The employer’s presumptive right to fire 
employees at will—for good reason, for bad reason, or for no reason at all—has been 
drastically cut back in the last sixty years. . . . The at-will rule now coexists with numerous 
important exceptions—statutory and common law, state and federal—that prohibit . . . . 
discrimination based on race, sex, age, or other characteristics.”). 
218.  Of course, as shown earlier, a court’s choices as to how tight a fit to demand between the 
plaintiff and the comparator are contestable. But once those choices have been made, there 
can be no denying the difference in treatment, should one exist. 
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characteristic neither requires “special training” nor presents great difficulties. 
Put in legitimacy terms, then, the facts appear to be doing the work. 
Of course, as discussed above, not all harassing acts or stereotyping 
statements can be linked to a protected trait and treated as discriminatory.219 
But, from a legitimacy standpoint, if the context reveals acts or statements that 
are widely assumed to reflect discriminatory intent, the Court need not expend 
reputational capital to find the presence of discrimination. We see this, for 
example, in cases where courts have little difficulty finding statements that 
mothers should not work outside the home while raising young children to be 
sex-related220 or that calling an African-American man a “boy” can be racially 
derogatory.221  
 
219.  The debates among experts about whether Wal-Mart stereotyped and then discriminated 
against its female employees underscore this point. Cf. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & 
Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social 
Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1742-43 (2008) (identifying the sex discrimination case of 
Dukes v. Wal-Mart as a landmark case for “the use of social science research on stereotyping 
to support claims for relief in employment discrimination [lawsuits]”). This is apart from 
the question whether the acts and statements are sufficiently harmful to exceed the tolerance 
for low-grade discrimination. 
220.  In applying Price Waterhouse to a family responsibilities discrimination suit, for example, the 
Second Circuit recently rejected an employer’s argument that disparaging comments about a 
woman’s commitment to work after having children could not be treated as sex-based 
“without comparative evidence of what was said about fathers.” Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004). The statements included 
inquiries as to how the plaintiff was “planning on spacing [her] offspring,” requests that the 
plaintiff “not get pregnant until [her supervisor] retire[d],” suggestions that the plaintiff 
“wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child,” and statements that it was 
“‘not possible for [the plaintiff] to be a good mother and have this job.’” Id. at 115 (first and 
fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found 
specifically that no such comparison was required to see discriminatory intent. Instead, “the 
notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are 
incompatible, are properly considered to be, themselves, gender-based.” Id. at 121. Invoking 
Price Waterhouse, the court added that “stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of 
motherhood and employment ‘can certainly be evidence that gender played a part’ in an 
employment decision,” and that, therefore, “stereotyping of women as caregivers can by 
itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.” Id. at 122 
(quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 480 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). The court identified other 
circuit courts in agreement that these types of comments support a finding of discriminatory 
intent. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 
2000) (holding that a direct supervisor’s “specifically question[ing] whether [the plaintiff] 
would be able to manage her work and family responsibilities” supported a finding of 
discriminatory animus, where the plaintiff’s employment was terminated shortly 
thereafter); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding, in a 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act case, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that “a 
supervisor’s statement to a woman known to be pregnant that she was being fired so that 
she could ‘spend more time at home with her children’ reflected unlawful motivations 
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Comparators become important, then, in situations where the challenged 
conduct is not easily or obviously recognized, per these social understandings, 
as embodying discriminatory intent or, more colloquially, as speaking for itself. 
In these cases, comparators’ empirical overtones suggest that the inquiry 
involves more than just the subjective preferences of a particular court, which 
Justice Thomas derided in response to the noncomparative analysis in 
Olmstead.222 Consider the Court’s early pregnancy cases in this light. The 
comparison of pregnant and nonpregnant people did not produce facts 
showing that the challenged rules restricting pregnancy benefits were “based 
on sex.”223 Indeed, the Court in Gilbert wrote that it needed only the most 
“cursory” analysis to reach that conclusion.224 Had the Court wanted to “see” 
discriminatory intent in that distinction, it would have needed a source other 
than the comparator to do so. At the time, however, the Court may have sensed 
there was not widespread agreement on the connection between pregnancy-
related restrictions and sex discrimination. Consequently, without a 
comparator or easy connection between the employer’s acts and discriminatory 
intent, the majority seemed to suggest that a finding of sex discrimination 
would have reflected its subjective sensibilities rather than its objective 
judgment, thereby undermining its legitimacy.225 
 
because it invoked widely understood stereotypes the meaning of which is hard to 
mistake”). 
221.  See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed its earlier determination that “the [‘boy’] comments were ambiguous stray remarks 
. . . and are not sufficient circumstantial evidence of bias” to sustain the plaintiff’s race 
discrimination claim. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 08-16135, 2010 WL 3244920, at *13 (11th 
Cir. Aug. 17, 2010) (alternation in original). 
222.  See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 624 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The 
Court showed its sensitivity to this type of critique while allowing a non-comparison-based 
sex discrimination challenge to the compensation of the female prison guards in County of 
Washington v. Gunther, emphasizing that the discrimination inquiry did not “require a court 
to make its own subjective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs.” 452 
U.S. 161, 181 (1981). 
223.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976).  
224.  Id. 
225.  The dissenters, by contrast, would have located sexually discriminatory intent in the 
pregnancy classification following the same model that the Court has used since for linking 
stereotyping and harassment to discriminatory intent. They stated that nothing more than 
“common sense” was necessary to see the link between the two. Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t offends common sense to suggest that a classification revolving around 
pregnancy is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”). 
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C. The Call for Experts as a Response to Legitimacy Concerns 
This legitimacy-protective dynamic that leads courts to prefer 
quasi-empirical demonstrations of discriminatory intent via the comparator 
heuristic also helps explain why scholars have stepped up the call for expert 
testimony in employment discrimination claims. Experts, like comparative 
data, enable courts to avoid the appearance of engaging in the arguably 
sociological task of discerning identity discrimination.226 
In part, experts may be useful within the comparator framework to expand 
courts’ sense of which comparisons could be probative. Charles Sullivan, for 
example, argues that courts need help with the “real question” of “when the 
putative comparator is similar enough to justify the inference” of 
discrimination.227 He suggests that experts can establish the “standard of care” 
against which an employer’s conduct can be measured.228 For Minna Kotkin, 
who documents courts’ difficulty observing discrimination when a 
discrimination claim rests on multiple grounds, experts are likewise the key to 
expanding courts’ understanding of how stereotypes operate and their 
conception of appropriate comparators.229 
The centrality of experts to theories that advocate noncomparative methods 
for observing discrimination similarly can be understood as responding to, or 
at least reflecting sensitivity to, the judicial-legitimacy concerns just described. 
The implicit bias literature, for example, highlights the ways in which experts 
can document the presence of implicit identity-related biases and the effects of 
those biases on workplace decisions.230 If carried out by experts, this approach 
 
226.  Still, courts must engage in a potentially sociological assessment when evaluating the 
admissibility of testimony by sociologists, cognitive psychologists, and other experts on 
discrimination under the standard set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993). Daubert requires federal courts to screen expert testimony for “scientific validity” 
to ensure reliability and relevance. Id. at 594-95. Some have suggested that Daubert has 
presented a particular hurdle for expert testimony in discrimination cases. See Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil 
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 551-55 (2010) (discussing 
scholarship addressing the effect of Daubert on the admission of expert testimony in 
discrimination cases and observing that Daubert, together with summary judgment 
practices, may be part of a “lethal combination” that disadvantages plaintiffs in civil rights 
and employment discrimination cases). 
227.  Sullivan, supra note 3, at 223. 
228.  Id. at 237. 
229.  Kotkin, supra note 15, at 1449, 1495-97. 
230.  For recent discussion and review of implicit bias research in the social sciences, see, for 
example, Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Jerry Kang & 
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to identifying discriminatory intent that is otherwise not readily observable can 
have the appearance of objectivity and, relatedly, of being driven by factors 
other than the influence of the court’s subjective preferences. 
The legitimacy concerns also help explain why, even if a plurality of the 
Supreme Court dismissed the expert testimony regarding sex stereotyping at 
Price Waterhouse as “icing on the cake,” those litigating the case had thought 
the testimony might be helpful. If the Court had not found the link between 
the statements made and the partnership denial to Ann Hopkins to be so 
noncontroversial, then there would have been little, other than the Court’s own 
judgments, to confirm the link between the statements and the protected 
characteristic of sex. In this light, the expert testimony in the case can be seen 
as a quasi-empirical source to verify or even compel that judgment. 
This move to locate determinations about discriminatory intent in experts 
can be characterized as simply shifting the legitimacy debate from the 
observation of discrimination to the treatment of expert testimony, where the 
debate is similarly fraught.231 Moreover, the increased focus on experts (with 
their attendant high costs)232 risks exacerbating existing resource imbalances 
between plaintiffs and defendants, making the move difficult in all but class 
actions and unusually high-value discrimination cases. Still, conceptually at 
least, the shift may be just enough to overcome the legitimacy concerns to 
which courts are so vulnerable. Justice Scalia has written, in the sexual 
harassment context, that “common sense” and “an appropriate sensitivity to 
social context” is all that is necessary to discern discriminatory intent.233 But 
where there is no easy agreement about how best to understand the social 
context, courts again become vulnerable to charges of imposing their own 
preferences on a workplace if there is no extrajudicial source that can be said to 
have compelled their observation of discrimination.234 
 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2006); and Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral 
Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. 
L. REV. 997 (2006). The Court has long recognized that these biases can result in cognizable 
discrimination. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (acknowledging 
“the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” in employment). My focus here is 
on how courts can come to see the operation of these stereotypes and prejudices. 
231.  See supra note 226. 
232.  Cf. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 177 (2010) (noting 
the significant cost of expert testimony). 
233.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
234.  This is not to suggest that expert evidence will always be accepted by courts as sufficient or 
decisive to establish the presence of discriminatory intent, but instead only that the expert 
testimony enables courts to invoke an external source when drawing the link between the 
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D. Legitimacy Concerns and the Viability of Second-Generation Discrimination 
Theories 
These legitimacy concerns appear to present a particular hurdle for 
second-generation discrimination theories because, ordinarily, there are no 
comparators for intersectional, identity performance, or structural claims. If 
these theories are to translate into practice, their success will depend on eliding 
the comparator heuristic and finding a different means of exposing the 
discrimination at issue, such as the contextual approach of the stereotyping and 
harassment cases. 
Although relatively few second-generation theories have succeeded in 
making this move to contextual analysis or in finding an alternate 
methodology, “family responsibilities discrimination” theory has had notable 
success in gaining doctrinal traction and may offer valuable lessons.235 The 
theory, known as FRD, is concerned with the ways in which employees, 
particularly women, face barriers in the workplace associated with their 
parenting or other caregiving responsibilities.236 Often employees who suffer 
adverse action related to their family responsibilities cannot show 
discrimination through a comparator either because there are no similarly 
situated coworkers or because the potential comparators in a workplace are all 
women or otherwise share the same protected trait. 
 
challenged conduct and the protected characteristic. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that expert testimony about sex 
stereotyping at Price Waterhouse would not have been enough to give rise to inference of 
discriminatory intent). 
235.  See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1311, 1357 (2008) (stating that FRD lawsuits have “cemented that plaintiffs in Title VII 
disparate treatment cases may show [family responsibilities] discrimination even when they 
lack a comparator”); see also Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2008). 
236.  Joan Williams and Stephanie Bornstein have defined family responsibilities discrimination 
as “discrimination against employees based on their responsibilities to care for family 
members,” which includes “pregnancy discrimination, discrimination against mothers and 
fathers, and discrimination against workers with other family caregiving responsibilities.” 
Williams & Bornstein, supra note 235, at 1313. They have observed that “[w]hile FRD most 
commonly occurs against pregnant women and mothers of young children, it can also affect 
fathers who wish to take on more than a nominal role in family caregiving and employees 
who care for aging parents or ill or disabled partners.” Id. For additional discussion of FRD, 
see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 101-10 (2000); and JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, 
Introduction to WORKLIFE LAW’S GUIDE TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION 
(2006). 
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Rather than try to work from within the comparator heuristic, advocates 
for recognition of FRD worked around it and, centrally, engaged experts (as 
well as popular culture) to ease courts’ way into seeing the link between 
employers’ skepticism of workers with family responsibilities and the protected 
characteristic of sex. Social scientists have been particularly important to this 
effort, as they have documented “an underlying schema that assumes a lack of 
competence and commitment when women are viewed through the lens of 
motherhood and housework.”237 These data, supplemented by additional 
research, do the work of linking maternal stereotypes to discriminatory intent. 
Perhaps responding to Geduldig and Gilbert, where the Court was unable to 
bring itself to see the pregnancy-sex connection, FRD advocates effectively 
relocated the task of observing discriminatory intent from the courts to expert 
social scientists. 
FRD recognition advocates have sought to establish the link between 
employers’ adverse treatment of parents and sexism in the popular culture as 
well, so that the link between an employer’s skepticism toward a new mother’s 
work ethic and sex discrimination can be seen easily and without any special 
training.238 Thus, when these advocates celebrate that courts have accepted 
non-comparator-based FRD claims, we can understand this success as deriving 
in part from judicial confidence in public acceptance of the caregiver-sex 
discrimination link because public acceptance minimizes the risk that courts 
will appear to be meddling unduly in employer freedom or imposing their 
subjective views of discrimination.239 
 
237.  Williams & Bornstein, supra note 235, at 1327. 
238.  Id. at 1314 (describing the issue of caregiver discrimination as one that “has ‘arrived’ in the 
public consciousness”). 
239.  In a more limited way, discrimination claims related to gender identity and performance 
also have begun to gain traction. Compare Schroer v. Billington, 525 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 
2007) (refusing to dismiss a sex discrimination claim against the Library of Congress, which 
withdrew a job offer it had made to a military specialist upon learning she was transgender), 
with Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a sex discrimination 
claim brought by an airline pilot who was fired after the airline learned she was 
transgender). Some of the reasons for the more recent claims’ success relate to judicial 
perceptions about the fixed nature of sex in transgender individuals, consistent with the 
legitimacy concerns regarding identity described earlier. But others, more relevant to the 
inquiry here, derive from the sex stereotyping in these cases, which is as blatant and 
relatively easy to recognize as the stereotyping in Price Waterhouse. 
  
discrimination by comparison 
801 
 
By contrast, consider the poor track record of challenges to sex-based dress 
and grooming codes as discriminatory.240 In these situations, the underlying 
theoretical claim is that an employer’s insistence on having men and women 
groom and dress themselves differently is not materially different from first-
generation-style sex-based classified advertisements or blanket refusals to hire 
women; in both, the employer impermissibly polices gender norms.241 Yet 
courts regularly do not see the sex-based distinction as discriminatory, in part 
because of the way in which they apply a comparator analysis to these cases.242 
The legitimacy concerns can help illuminate why comparators are so 
difficult to escape in this context. In the view of most courts to have addressed 
these challenges, the link between the sex-based rules and discriminatory 
intent is not nearly as “obvious” or easy as in the case of sexual harassment or 
sex stereotyping. Even relative to FRD, courts do not see evidence that the 
public imagination considers grooming codes to be obviously discriminatory. 
Nor is there a wealth of social science on which courts can rely, as there is for 
FRD, to do the work of establishing that these grooming codes embody sex-
based stereotypes or otherwise to illuminate and verify that sex-based 
discriminatory intent is embedded in the codes. 
 
240.  See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a sex 
discrimination challenge to a casino grooming code that imposed different requirements on 
men and women); cf. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(affirming summary judgment for an employer where an employee alleged that a “no facial 
jewelry” policy constituted religious discrimination); Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 
7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5-6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008) (finding no merit to 
the plaintiff’s allegation that a grooming policy that prohibited dreadlocks and cornrows 
constituted race discrimination against African-American employees). But see Tamimi v. 
Howard Johnson Co., 807 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming a judgment in favor of an 
employee who alleged sex discrimination over a dress code that required female employees 
to wear makeup and lipstick). 
241.  For a discussion of grooming standards and gender norms, see Devon Carbado et al., 
Foreword: Making Makeup Matter, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2007). Carbado et al. 
state that “grooming standards can (but needn’t always) function to regulate and give 
content to our identities.” Id. at 2; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
(sustaining a first-generation-type challenge to the exclusion of women from the Virginia 
Military Academy). 
242.  Apart from the comparator issue, some courts have treated dress and grooming codes, as 
opposed to other employer conduct, as falling more broadly within an employer’s discretion 
and, therefore, as less susceptible to restriction via Title VII and other antidiscrimination 
measures. See Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 353-55 (2008) (“[T]he typical dress code that simply distinguishes the 
appearance of men and women in the workplace has been found to be unobjectionable by 
courts.”); id. at 355 n.4 (citing cases). 
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Because the link between sex-based grooming codes and impermissible 
stereotyping does not fall within Price Waterhouse’s “no special training” 
standard, some other methodology is needed to review the discrimination 
allegation, and courts most often funnel these cases through what amounts to a 
comparator analysis. As the Ninth Circuit found, for example, when sustaining 
a casino’s extensive dress code that included different makeup, hair, and nail 
care requirements for men and women, “[t]he only evidence in the record to 
support the stereotyping claim is [the plaintiff’s] own subjective reaction to the 
makeup requirement.”243 The court contrasted the employee’s claim in that 
case with cases in which, it suggested, the link between a dress code and 
discrimination would be easier to find, such as where a dress code “tend[ed] to 
stereotype women as sex objects” or invite sexual harassment.244 Given courts’ 
interest in avoiding sociological judgments about identity discrimination that 
infringe on employer freedom, it is not surprising that where the court did not 
find “clear” stereotyping and where a comparison did not produce a striking 
difference in the treatment of men and women,245 the court did not find 
discrimination because of sex.246 
In short, courts’ concerns about navigating between the Scylla of 
sociological tasks and the Charybdis of employer autonomy surely account for 
some, if not all, of the comparators’ appeal. With their empirical, legalistic cast, 
comparators strongly suggest that courts’ findings of impermissible 
discrimination are the product of neither an amateur judicial evaluation of 
social norms and workplace dynamics nor a court’s arrogant disregard of 
employer autonomy. Instead, they are—or, more precisely, have the appearance 
of being—compelled simply and cleanly by both the facts and the governing 
law. 
 
243.  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
244.  Id. 
245.  The dissenters disagreed with this characterization of the policy, finding that the grooming 
code’s makeup requirements for women imposed a distinct burden not imposed on men and 
that this difference in treatment was “‘because of’ sex” and was “clearly and unambiguously 
impermissible under Title VII.” Id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (describing Jespersen’s 
evidence as “show[ing] that Harrah’s fired her because she did not comply with a grooming 
policy that imposed a facial uniform (full makeup) on only female bartenders”).  
246.  Again, the substantive consequence of this application of the comparator heuristic was to 
limit the reach of discrimination law and its underlying norms. 
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vi.  prospects for change 
Assuming that no social scientific advance will render obsolete the need for 
judicial inquiries into discriminatory motive and that courts will retain their 
sensitivity to the legitimacy concerns just described, this Part suggests several 
possibilities for expanding courts’ methodological repertoire for observing 
discrimination in light of comparators’ costly deficiencies. Although full 
development and evaluation of alternate approaches is beyond this Article’s 
scope, the suggestions below aim to counter the comparator demand’s 
flattening effect on discrimination law and norms in both first- and second-
generation theories and cases while also taking account of both judicial-
legitimacy and accountability concerns.247 
Setting aside strategies for enlarging the set of acts and statements that are 
widely understood to expose discriminatory intent,248 potential means for 
expanding the set of approaches used to observe discrimination range from 
tweaks to the current comparator regime to more expansive frameworks. The 
latter have the benefit of allowing more nuanced review, but they also bear the 
weakness, in some cases, of providing less guidance and less protection to 
courts concerned about their legitimacy. Ultimately, I argue that a move 
toward applying the contextual analysis that is already familiar from the 
stereotyping and harassment jurisprudence will best address both the 
legitimacy concerns to which comparators respond and the accountability flaws 
embedded in that methodological choice—with the additional benefit of 
restoring a less formalistic, more substantive treatment of discrimination law 
and norms. 
 
247.  Although the focus here is on developing options that might enable greater judicial 
recognition of diverse forms of discrimination, it is also possible that, again recalling Fuller, 
litigation and adjudication are simply not well-suited to resolving certain kinds of complex 
suits, including those that are the focus of second-generation theorizing. See supra notes 
25-28 and accompanying text. Legislative and policy advocacy as well as collaborative efforts 
with employers, public accommodation operators, and others may ultimately be more 
effective in eliminating barriers related to protected (and other) traits. However, because the 
primary focus of this Article is on what courts can do, and because many of the extra-
litigation efforts just described operate in the shadow of doctrine, the alternate analytic 
approaches here warrant consideration, even if all they do is enhance the possibilities for 
success of the nonlitigation strategies. 
248.  The movement to have FRD recognized provides a strategic model worthy of consideration 
for these kinds of efforts because of its combined focus on developing social science and 
establishing understanding of the link between family responsibilities and sex 
discrimination in the public’s mind. 
  
the yale law journal  120: 728   2 011  
804 
 
A. Involving Experts in Setting Comparators’ Contours 
A first option would be to accept the comparator methodology’s dominance 
but expand the conception of an appropriate comparator. As noted earlier, the 
Court itself rejected a formulation demanding that a comparison produce a 
result that “virtually . . . jump[s] off the page and slap[s] you in the face” 
before a finding of discrimination can be made.249 Beyond that, the suggestions 
of Kotkin and Sullivan that experts be used to establish reasonable comparators 
despite differences in jobs, supervisors, or even employers could prove helpful 
in enabling more employees to identify adequate comparators.250 By recasting 
the selection of comparators as a determination involving facts subject to 
expert analysis and verification, rather than as a matter turning exclusively on 
the judgment of the court, it might be possible to broaden the 
conceptualization of comparators while attending to the legitimacy constraints 
in this area. 
For first-generation theories, this expansion would almost certainly be 
helpful in mitigating the comparator heuristic’s barrier-like effects. The 
broader the pool, the more likely an employee will be able to identify a 
colleague who is similarly situated but for the protected characteristic. 
The benefit flowing from the sheer increase in numbers of potential 
comparators would be much more limited for second-generation 
intersectionality claims, however. Recall that the difficulty in these cases does 
not lie, primarily, in finding a comparator. Instead, when an individual appears 
anomalous amidst the comparator pool because of his or her particular 
combination of traits, courts tend to be skeptical—even with comparators—
that discrimination, as opposed to a quirk particular to that individual, 
motivated the employer’s adverse action.251 
For identity-performance-based suits, broadening the pool of comparators 
would likewise be unavailing. For example, returning to Carbado and Gulati’s 
example of the fifth black woman, a broader comparator pool would not, in 
itself, help that employee show that her race (rather than other factors related 
to her personal presentation) was the basis for the adverse treatment. Even 
with a broad pool, the employer could still produce the four other black women 
whom it promoted to strengthen its argument that it had legitimate, 
 
249.  Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006) (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
129 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
250.   See supra, notes 227-229 and accompanying text. 
251.  See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. A broader comparator pool might possibly 
enable a plaintiff to invoke systemic evidence of discrimination by identifying a greater 
number of similar coworkers who have suffered adverse action from the employer. 
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nondiscriminatory reasons for denying promotion to the fifth black woman. 
With the benefit of a broader comparator pool, the fifth black woman could 
potentially identify a non-black woman who had a similar style but received a 
promotion, but as a practical matter it is difficult to imagine this sort of 
comparison-based claim succeeding. Even if the employee could find a 
comparator, employers could be counted on to undermine the broader 
comparator pool as insufficiently attuned to salient differences in workplace 
cultures that are relevant to consideration of employees’ personal style. 
For second-generation claims based on structural discrimination, where 
workplace patterns make discrimination difficult to observe and trace, 
expanding the size of the comparator pool would seem to be of marginal 
assistance, at best. Having more employees in the mix could conceivably help 
illuminate the effects of the discrimination that is masked within employee 
interactions. But as much of the structurally focused literature makes clear, the 
structures and relationships within workplaces that facilitate and exacerbate 
diffuse and subtle discrimination will still escape observation within a 
comparator framework. 
B. Considering Hypothetical Comparators 
A related possibility would be to expand the current comparator-based 
approaches by allowing for hypothetical comparators as well as actual 
comparators.252 This approach has been embraced in England, for example, 
where the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 “permits a comparison to be drawn 
between the way in which a woman is treated and the way in which a 
‘hypothetical male’ would have been treated.”253 The European Union has 
likewise embraced the value of the hypothetical comparator through its 
discrimination-related directives, which provide that discrimination can be 
found “where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or 
would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic 
 
252.  Even this proposal would move beyond the discrimination theory advanced by Justice 
Thomas in Olmstead, which restricts the recognition of discrimination to situations in which 
actual differences of treatment between actual employees can be documented. 
253.  See Sandra Fredman, Reforming Equal Pay Laws, 37 INDUS. L.J. 193, 200 (2008); see also Iain 
Steele, Note, Beyond Equal Pay?, 37 INDUS. L.J. 119 (2008) (recognizing the value of a 
hypothetical male comparator for a woman bringing a claim under the Sex Discrimination 
Act of 1975). 
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origin.”254 As one commentator has observed, “Clearly, the comparator need 
not ‘exist’; establishment of the probability of ‘his’ or ‘her’ better treatment will 
be enough.”255 
This shift would enhance even further the benefits that flow from 
broadening the actual comparator pool, at least for first-generation cases, by 
providing more opportunities to produce a discrimination-exposing 
comparison. Second-generation cases, by contrast, would experience less gain 
from this change for the same reasons that gains from enlarging the set of 
actual comparators would be limited. 
The potential problem is that the move to a hypothetical comparator may 
tread more closely on judicial-legitimacy concerns than an approach that 
expands the scope of “real” comparators because it overtly acknowledges the 
court’s work in seeing discrimination rather than simply in “finding” 
discrimination in the facts presented. Yet there may be ways around this 
difficulty. As Sandra Fredman observed with respect to the United Kingdom’s 
equal pay laws, “[T]here is a well-developed methodology for determining 
what a hypothetical male would have been paid, using either a proportionate 
value method or a proxy method.”256 Thus, this type of expert-driven, data-
based portrait of the hypothetical comparator could conceivably fit neatly with 
the judicial-legitimacy concerns in this area. 
However, while either legislative commitments or statistical analysis might 
work in the equal pay context, where job criteria and pay ranges are arguably 
susceptible to quantification and comparison,257 hypothesizing a comparison to 
 
254.  Council Directive 2000/43/EC, art. 2, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22, 24 (emphasis added); see also 
Council Directive 2006/54/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23; Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 
O.J. (L 303) 16. 
255.  Elisabeth Holzleithner, Mainstreaming Equality: Dis/Entangling Grounds of Discrimination, 14 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 927, 934 (2005). For additional discussion of the use and 
limitations of comparators in Australia, Canada, and Europe, see generally Aileen 
McColgan, Cracking the Comparator Problem: Discrimination, “Equal” Treatment and the Role 
of Comparisons, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 650 (2006), which collects and analyzes cases 
from European supranational and domestic courts that address the use of comparators; 
Sophia Reibetanz Moreau, Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups, 5 J.L. & 
EQUAL. 81 (2006), which analyzes the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of comparators; and 
Belinda Smith, From Wardley to Purvis—How Far Has Australian Anti-Discrimination Law 
Come in 30 Years?, 21 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 3 (2008), which critiques the High Court of 
Australia’s constrained use of hypothetical comparators. 
256.  Fredman, supra note 253, at 201. 
257.  The failure of most comparable worth litigation in the United States suggests, however, that 
even this effort might be doomed by charges of unconstrainable subjectivity. See, e.g., Birch 
v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Probate Court, 392 F.3d 151, 170 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that courts have 
refused to apply Gunther analysis where a comparable worth case “involves a subjective 
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prove the discriminatory treatment of a corporate executive or a group of plant 
workers where there are no actual comparators will not have that factual, 
legitimacy-protecting cast. Imagine, for example, that a court faced with a 
discrimination claim by the only African American senior executive at a bank 
was asked to hypothesize a comparator to assess the adverse treatment that had 
been alleged. While a court might be willing to stretch and consider an expert’s 
analysis of actually comparable positions and employees in the industry, the 
creation of a purely hypothetical comparator, even if by an expert, arguably 
leaves a court with little to show that it has observed trait-based discrimination 
rather than simply bad, but permissible, treatment. 
Alternately, a hypothetical comparator might elide these concerns if 
legislative bodies were to provide an “elaboration . . . of criteria of assessment,” 
as the European Court of Justice has suggested.258 Courts could then point to 
these bodies, rather than their own views, as driving the comparison. Yet 
again, while this could conceivably work in the equal pay area (though the 
comparable worth movement’s experience suggests that this would not be 
feasible in the United States),259 a general statement of acceptable workplace 
behavior would be exceedingly difficult to conceptualize in a way that would 
capture discriminatory conduct but not workplace behavior that is offensive 
but permissible. Even if one could be created, it would face serious challenges 
from extant political and jurisprudential commitments to employer discretion 
in workplace governance. 
C. Moving Beyond Comparators 
The discrimination case law and literature also contain the seeds of 
methodologies that could displace or supplement comparators as the primary 
heuristic for locating and evaluating discrimination and, in doing so, alleviate 
the effects of comparators’ limitations on both first- and second-generation 
cases. This section looks first to experts and then to contextual analysis as the 
methodological alternatives most likely to succeed because of their sensitivity 
to the legitimacy and accountability concerns set out above. 
 
assessment of different positions with different duties” (citing EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1986))). See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS 
AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). 
258.  See Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, 1980 E.C.R. 1275, 1289. 
259.  See supra note 257. 
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The value of experts, not just to expand conceptions of comparators but to 
serve, themselves, as a lens for observing discriminatory intent emerges directly 
from the second-generation scholarship. Both the implicit bias and structural 
discrimination literature show that expert analysis can aid courts in seeing 
which particular structures may foster discrimination.260 
The difficulty with experts, relative to the legitimacy concerns, comes in 
drawing the link from the insights of the implicit bias and structurally focused 
literatures to the dynamics of a specific workplace and the adverse treatment of 
a particular employee.261 Although this can be done, methods for seeing 
discrimination are likely to be more attractive to courts to the extent that the 
experts, rather than the court, appear to be illuminating the discrimination 
within the workplace at issue. 
Yet another possibility—and the one that I advocate most strongly here—
would be simply to put comparison in its place as one technique among many 
for observing discrimination rather than to view it as the technique that must 
be used before discrimination can be seen.262 This change would also move 
contextual evaluation from its confined role in stereotyping and harassment 
cases to a new status as a legitimate analytic option in all cases. Even in its 
simplicity, this type of frame-shift in the way in which we see discrimination 
cases could be transformative in diminishing some of the worst offenses of the 
comparator paradigm. It would do so by more closely matching the 
 
260.  See supra note 230; see also William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness? Challenges of Using Expert 
Testimony on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 377 (2003). 
261.  If the research showing the general pervasiveness of implicit bias were accepted as sufficient 
to show discrimination in a specific case, then anyone with a trait that is the subject of an 
implicit bias in a particular context would conceivably be able to prevail on a discrimination 
claim. The vast potential reach of this type of reliance on experts would inevitably produce 
its own powerful legitimacy-threatening concerns related to judicial overregulation of the 
workplace. These would be separate from questions about whether employers should be 
held accountable for acting on biases about which they are unaware. See Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 
479 (2007) (responding to the critique of implicit bias evidence as scientifically invalid and 
noting that “the case for using the law to respond to the problem of implicit bias remains 
strong”); Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, 
New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) (maintaining that it is well settled that discrimination 
law can and should respond to subtle forms of discrimination, including those exposed by 
implicit bias research); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1132-33 
(1999) (arguing against employer liability for “unconscious disparate treatment” because 
“employers have little effective control over unconscious bias”); cf. Nagareda, supra note 26, 
at 156-61 (discussing critiques of implicit bias and structural discrimination theories in the 
context of evaluating discrimination class actions). 
262.  This would be outside the context of harassment and stereotyping cases, of course. 
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observational tools courts use with both the refinements to theory that have 
taken place in recent decades and our expanded knowledge of the dynamics of 
discrimination. 
Indeed, if comparators are properly understood to be one among a set of 
imperfect methodological choices for seeing discrimination, courts’ cordoning 
off “stray” remarks from consideration, rather than looking holistically at all 
incidents in the work environment as they do in harassment and stereotyping 
cases, no longer seems so sensible (if it ever did).263 In short, a contextual 
approach would free courts from the artificial blinders imposed by the 
comparator jurisprudence that short-circuit the analysis of discrimination 
claims and produce constricted outcomes without explanation or justification. 
This move would obviously be beneficial for first-generation cases because 
it would expand the means by which employees could seek to shed light on 
discriminatory intent. Discrimination claimants would no longer need to 
produce a comparable coworker to overcome the prima facie threshold; nor 
would comparators be seen as the gold standard for proving discriminatory 
intent. Instead, a picture of the entire work environment, including statements 
by supervisors and coworkers, the demographics of the firm and the 
surrounding workforce, and the dynamics of the relationship between the 
employee and other relevant employees would all be appropriately considered 
by courts deciding whether to allow an employee to proceed to trial. 
For second-generation claims, an escape from the comparator demand 
similarly could prove invaluable by enabling exposure of the nuanced, 
contextually rooted, and complex forms of discrimination not reached by first-
generation theories and foreclosed by a demand for comparators. As would be 
true for first-generation cases, the removal of the comparator demand as part 
of the prima facie case, or even as an essential part of the proof of pretext, 
would enable plaintiffs to turn to other sources to shed light on the 
discriminatory work environment. Again, comments and acts by other 
employees, firm demographics, and firm policies, among other aspects of 
workplace life and governance, could all be deemed worthy of consideration in 
deciding whether to allow a discrimination claim to proceed. Employers who 
single out some members of a protected class for adverse treatment could no 
longer immunize themselves solely on the ground that others with similar 
characteristics had not been similarly harmed. In other words, releasing the 
comparator’s grip on discrimination analysis reopens the possibility that 
discrimination jurisprudence could develop in ways that recognize more than 
just the most formalistic and easily legible violations of discrimination laws. 
 
263.  See supra Part IV. 
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A skeptic might object that context-based methodology should be used 
sparingly, just as heightened scrutiny of identity-based classifications is 
limited. On this view, while we can be reasonably sure that impermissible bias 
is at work where there has been harassment or stereotyping, just as we are 
willing to suspect similar bias in the use of certain classifications,264 other 
situations will not give us the same basis to doubt the employer’s actions. The 
concern, from this perspective, would be that if we enable an employee to 
trigger a contextual inquiry outside the presence of harassment or stereotyping 
remarks (as in a challenge to a breastfeeding ban, for example), courts would 
lack the constraints necessary to prevent them from unduly infringing 
employer freedom.265 
The analogy is misplaced, however, because a context-focused analysis of a 
discrimination claim is concerned with what types of evidence will be 
considered; it does not come with a heightened-scrutiny-style presumption 
that the employer has acted impermissibly. Indeed, as discussed earlier, even 
the presence of overtly sexualized or racialized comments or acts does not 
necessarily produce an inference of discriminatory intent related to an 
employee’s protected characteristic.266 There is no reason to think that a shift 
to a contextual analysis in cases without stereotyping or harassment claims will 
alleviate the doctrine’s burden on the plaintiff to show that the conduct at issue 
is both serious and linked to the employee’s protected characteristic(s). That is, 
in a case where an employee lacks a comparator but can point to an adverse 
 
264.  For extended discussion about the relationship between heightened scrutiny and rational 
basis review in the equal protection context, see, for example, Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality 
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004). For discussion of context-sensitive review in 
other constitutional contexts, see, for example, Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 
629 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which 
discusses context-sensitivity with respect to standards for reviewing Establishment Clause 
violations as well as “many [other] standards in constitutional law”; and Neil S. Siegel, 
Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1655 
n.106 (2006), which describes the “context-sensitive, rough balancing of incommensurable 
values that is typical of doctrinal analysis in constitutional law.” 
265.  Extending the analogy, the skeptic might also argue that a comparator’s presence gives the 
court some reason, though not as much as in the case of harassment or stereotyping, to be 
suspicious of the workplace conduct at issue. Thus the presence of a comparator, on this 
view, could reasonably trigger something similar to a strong form of rational basis review. 
Without harassment, stereotyping, or a near-identical comparator, the skeptic would argue 
that courts should have no reason to be suspicious and, therefore, no reason to subject the 
employer’s actions to the relatively more searching contextual assessment. Indeed, we could 
characterize the approach courts take in the no-comparator cases as analogous to the 
weakest form of rational basis review, which gives the employer’s adverse action the 
strongest presumption of legitimacy. 
266.  See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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action—for example, some arguably trait-related remarks from coworkers—
and perhaps other circumstances, such as a pattern of exclusion from 
important events, the discrimination claim will not gain a free pass under a 
contextual review. Instead, it will merely, but importantly, have a chance to be 
heard, where under a comparator framework, it would be foreclosed from the 
outset. 
Of course, a move like this, which broadens the pool of potentially 
successful discrimination cases, has certain costs. With more cases surviving 
into later stages of litigation, employers are likely to pay employees more, and 
perhaps more quickly, to settle cases. Courts, too, will face greater burdens to 
the extent they are charged with overseeing a potential growth in longer-
lasting litigation.267 But, I would argue, these costs are more than matched by 
the benefit of having open jurisprudential discussion and debate about the 
proper reach of discrimination doctrine. This is not to say that courts (or 
employers) would easily embrace the kinds of complex, or even first-
generation, discrimination cases that currently lose because the plaintiff lacks a 
comparator. But under the current comparator regime, these cases, and the 
theories on which they rely, do not even get to the point of having a 
meaningful hearing absent a comparator. A move to a contextual evaluation 
would open the possibility of conversation and perhaps lead to refinement of 
the jurisprudence. 
Further, if we admit that the way in which we see discriminatory intent—in 
harassment and stereotyping cases as well as cases with comparators—rests on 
judicial judgment calls aided by whatever heuristics have been deployed, rather 
than being factually or legally compelled, then maintaining such different 
approaches begins to make less sense. A move toward contextualized 
assessment of all types of workplace rules starts to seem both more sensible 
and less troubling. 
 
267.  For plaintiffs, by contrast, the cost of a move to a context-focused regime would be virtually 
nil. If the production of a comparator were enough, on its own, to enable an employee to 
prevail, we might be concerned that employers would seek to invoke a contextual analysis to 
impede potentially successful comparator-based claims. But the comparator alone does not 
secure victory for the employee; instead, at most, the employee wins the right to survive 
summary judgment and bring his or her case to a jury. A context-focused analysis simply 
opens room for the employee to produce additional evidence of discrimination, which at 
most could supplement, but could not undermine, whatever observations about 
discrimination a court would make via a comparator. 
  




Judicial concerns about sociological inquiries and undue incursions into 
employer discretion, as well as comparators’ intuitive appeal as a means for 
observing discriminatory intent, will no doubt enable the comparator 
methodology to retain a central place in discrimination jurisprudence. Still, the 
methodology’s embedded expectation that identities are simple and that 
workers are easily comparable belies contemporary understandings of both 
identity and the modern workforce. Consequently, the comparator demand has 
foreclosed most discrimination claims and, further, shrunk the very idea of 
discrimination, both truncating traditional discrimination jurisprudence and all 
but guaranteeing that second-generation discrimination theories will not 
translate into law. 
Because comparators are, in this sense, so mismatched to their task of 
revealing trait-based discrimination, it is time to recognize them as but one 
among several imperfect methodologies rather than as foundational to 
discrimination itself. By dethroning comparators in this way and incorporating 
the contextual methodology used to observe discrimination in harassment and 
stereotyping cases, we may yet be able to diminish the damage caused by their 
troubling stranglehold over American discrimination law and theory. 
